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A GENERAL DEFENSE OF INFORMATION 
FIDUCIARIES 
ANDREW F. TUCH* 
ABSTRACT 
Countless high-profile abuses of user data by leading technology 
companies have raised a basic question: should firms that traffic in user 
data be held legally responsible to their users as “information fiduciaries”? 
Privacy legislation to impose fiduciary-like duties on data collectors enjoys 
bipartisan support but faces strong opposition from scholars. First, critics 
argue that the information-fiduciary concept flies in the face of fundamental 
corporate law principles that require firms to prioritize shareholder 
interests over those of consumers. Second, it is said that the overwhelming 
self-interest of large technology companies makes fiduciary loyalty 
impossible as a practical matter from the outset. 
This Essay finds neither objection convincing. The first objection rests 
on a mischaracterization of corporate law, which in reality would require 
compliance with user-regarding fiduciary obligations—the opposite of what 
critics fear. The second objection fails to convince because fiduciary law 
has proven itself adaptable enough to survive such challenges in other 
settings, such as in the asset management industry. The second objection 
nevertheless reveals a need for greater specificity of the scope and intensity 
of fiduciary duties that would be imposed under the information fiduciary 
model. Even so, neither objection plausibly undermines the model.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Lawmakers have their sights on the leviathans of our time—Facebook, 
Google, and other digital companies. Across the political spectrum, 
legislators condemn these firms’ conduct, accusing them of undermining 
user privacy and data security.1 Scholars and other commentators decry the 
regulatory status quo, seeking reform.2 One especially influential proposal 
has emerged: making digital companies “information fiduciaries” of their 
users.3 This reform, if implemented, would impose fiduciary duties of care, 
 
1. See, e.g., Daisuke Wakabayashi, Mike Isaac, Karen Weise, Jack Nicas & Sophia June, 13 
Ways the Government Went After Google, Facebook and Other Tech Giants This Year, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/technology/tech-investigations.html [https: 
//perma.cc/Y5XU-DXXS]. (“Lawmakers and federal and state officials have repeatedly gone after 
America’s tech giants in 2020 . . . . The backlash over big tech is one of the few areas where Democrats 
and Republicans are increasingly in agreement.”); David McLaughlin & Ben Brody, Big Tech Is Taking 
a Bipartisan Beating All over Washington, BLOOMBERG (July 18, 2019, 2:55 PM), https://www.bloombe 
rgquint.com/business/big-tech-is-taking-a-bipartisan-beating-all-over-washington [https://perma.cc/MP 
3T-33VX] (“The technology platforms that came under fire Tuesday were darlings of official 
Washington in the Obama years . . . . That admiration has been swept away amid criticism from 
Republicans and Democrats over competition, privacy and control over content on their platform.”). 
2. See infra notes 4, 6, 7, 15, and 17 and accompanying text. 
3. The information fiduciary proposal has attracted favorable attention in congressional 
hearings and the press. See, e.g., 164 CONG. REC. S2026 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2018) (statement of Sen. 
John Cornyn) (“Perhaps we should treat social media platforms as information fiduciaries and impose 
legal obligations on them . . . .”); Nathan Heller, We May Own Our Data, but Facebook Has a Duty to 
Protect It, NEW YORKER (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/tech/annals-of-technology/we-













confidentiality, and loyalty, intended to ensure that firms do not betray the 
confidence users place in them.4 The information fiduciary model is 
reflected in consumer privacy laws now under review by legislatures at the 
federal and state levels.5  
But while there is enthusiasm behind this model, it also faces significant 
opposition. The information-fiduciary model “could cure at most a small 
fraction of the problems associated with online platforms—and to the extent 
it does, only by undercutting directors’ duties to shareholders, undermining 
foundational principles of fiduciary law, or both,”6 write Lina Khan and 
David Pozen, referring to a proposal by Jack Balkin.7 Summarizing their 
critique, Pozen has written that this proposal is “flawed—likely beyond 
repair—on conceptual, legal, and normative grounds.”8 Their analysis raises 
two principal objections. First, the proposal is incompatible with corporate 
law in Delaware, where the relevant companies incorporate.9 Balkin’s user-
regarding duties would clash with shareholder-regarding corporate law 
duties, creating the problem of “conflicting fiduciary obligations”10 or 
 
degree, the [information] fiduciary model was the one toward which discussion [at the Senate Judiciary 
and Commerce Committees] slowly and chaotically converged.”); Russell Brandom, This Plan Would 
Regulate Facebook Without Going Through Congress, VERGE (Apr. 12, 2018, 11:32 AM), https://www. 
theverge.com/2018/4/12/17229258/facebook-regulation-fiduciaryrule-data-proposal-balkin [https://per 
ma.cc/7V4Y-ZUFK] (“[W]hen Sen. Brian Schatz (D-HI) mentioned . . . [the] concept of an information 
fiduciary, [Mark] Zuckerberg seemed to perk up.”). 
4. See Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1183, 1205–09 (2016) [hereinafter Balkin, Information Fiduciaries]; Jack M. Balkin, Lecture, 
2016 Sidley Austin Distinguished Lecture on Big Data Law and Policy: The Three Laws of Robotics in 
the Age of Big Data, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217, 1227–31 (2017) [hereinafter Balkin, Big Data Law and 
Policy].  
5. See Data Care Act of 2018, S. 3744, 115th Cong. (2018); New York Privacy Act, S.B. 5642, 
2019–2020 Reg. Sess. § 1102 (NY 2019). These proposed laws are regarded as reflecting the information 
fiduciary model. See Issie Lapowsky, New York’s Privacy Bill Is Even Bolder Than California’s, WIRED 
(June 4, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/new-york-privacy-act-bolder/ [https://perma.cc/ 
JQG4-FPH3].  
6. Lina M. Khan & David E. Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries, 133 HARV. 
L. REV. 497, 529 (2019). 
7. The proposal is most fully developed in Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 4. See 
also Jack M. Balkin, Essay, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private Governance, and 
New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1149, 1160–63 (2018); Jack M. Balkin, The 
Fiduciary Model of Privacy, 134 HARV. L. REV. F. 11 (2020) [hereinafter Balkin, Fiduciary Model of 
Privacy]; Jack M. Balkin, Essay, Free Speech Is a Triangle, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2011, 2047–54 (2018); 
Jack M. Balkin, Fixing Social Media’s Grand Bargain 11–15 (Hoover Working Grp. on Nat’l Sec., 
Tech., & L., Aegis Series Paper No. 1814, 2018), https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/do 
cs/balkin_webreadypdf.pdf[https://perma.cc/EZ79-Q3CN] [hereinafter Balkin, Fixing Social Media]; 
Jack M. Balkin & Jonathan Zittrain, A Grand Bargain to Make Tech Companies Trustworthy, ATLANTIC 
(Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/10/informationfiduciary/502346/ 
[https://perma.cc/PXQ6-8VBU]. 
8. See David Pozen, Balkanization on Balkinization: A Skeptical View of Information 
Fiduciaries, BALKINIZATION (Feb. 25, 2019, 5:26 PM), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2019/02/balkanizati 
on-on-balkinization.html [https://perma.cc/6J9S-Y2TT]. 
9. See Section I.A. 
10. Khan & Pozen, supra note 6, at 510. 











“divided loyalties.”11 Managing this problem would require either reform of 
corporate law or the watering down of the proposed duties,12 with 
companies forced to prioritize shareholders’ interests over those of users.13 
Second, digital companies’ powerful self-regarding incentives are at odds 
with users’ interests, undermining the case that these proposed duties can 
be fiduciary at all.14 Khan and Pozen’s critique has been broadly accepted 
by scholars15 and has led advocates to qualify their support for the fiduciary 
model.16 
Although these principal criticisms are levelled at Balkin’s proposal, 
they are directed at the information fiduciary at large, which “has, in one 
form or another, been circulating for some time.”17 Other scholars have 
contributed to the model.18 These criticisms threaten the entire, many-
 
11. Id. at 507. 
12. See supra notes 205–206 and accompanying text; see also Khan & Pozen, supra note 6, at 
535 (referring to “the watered-down version of fiduciary responsibility such a statute [imposing Balkin’s 
proposal] would codify”). 
13. Khan & Pozen, supra note 6, at 509 (“Delaware law would remain unaffected. The interests 
of shareholders would still come first.”). 
14. Id. at 512–13; see also Section II.A.  
15. See, e.g., Bryan H. Choi, Software as a Profession, 33 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 557, 562–63 
(2020) (“[C]ritics of the ‘information fiduciary’ model have rightly questioned whether software 
developers are genuine fiduciaries of their customers . . . .”); Julie E. Cohen, Scaling Trust and Other 
Fictions, L. & POL. ECON. PROJECT (May 29, 2019), https://lpeblog.org/2019/05/29/scaling-trust-and-o 
ther-fictions/#more-2442 [https://perma.cc/GJM5-XE9N] (“The trenchant critique by Khan and Pozen 
effectively exposes the emptiness at the heart of any proposal that proclaims a ‘fiduciary’ arrangement 
while leaving both the basic platform business model and the basic structure of the platform-consumer 
relationship undisturbed.”); Tamara Piety, Radical Skepticism About Information Fiduciaries, L. & POL. 
ECON. PROJECT (May 31, 2019), https://lpeblog.org/2019/05/31/radical-skepticism-about-information-
fiduciaries/?fbclid=IwAR3iWoZEs54UEzz3m0ViNYcpLWkphZ53T1-q52OwrslD36Q6OHV-p3xyW 
M [https://perma.cc/S5KA-GK62] (“Khan and Pozen are skeptical that such a fundamental conflict 
[between duties to shareholders and duties to users] can be resolved and I agree.”); id. (“Khan and Pozen 
do a good job at showing why the information fiduciary concept is [sic] offers false hope.”); Haochen 
Sun, Corporate Fundamental Responsibility: What Do Technology Companies Owe the World?, 74 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 898, 908 (2020) (“A major problem with the information fiduciary approach . . . is 
its inability to address this potential conflict [identified by Khan and Pozen].”); Michal Lavi, Do 
Platforms Kill?, 43 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 477, 545 n.458 (2020) (Khan and Pozen’s analysis 
“identifies tensions and ambiguities in the theory of information fiduciaries, as well as a number of 
reasons to doubt the theory’s capacity to resolve them satisfactorily.”). The one point scholars seem to 
agree on is the need for reform. For example, Khan and Pozen “largely agree with [Balkin’s] analysis of 
why certain digital firms should be regulated more vigorously.” Khan & Pozen, supra note 6, at 501. 
16. See Lapowsky, supra note 5 (referring to privacy groups that would continue supporting the 
fiduciary approach “given the right legislation” to accommodate Khan and Pozen criticisms). Balkin 
is said to now “assume[] the corporate-law fiduciary duties . . . would have to be curtailed in important 
respects to operationalize his proposal.” Khan & Pozen, supra note 6, at 509 n.58 (referring to the 
authors’ “recent conversations” with Balkin).  
17. Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, A Duty of Loyalty for Privacy Law, 99 WASH. U. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 18) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstra 
ct_id=3642217).  
18. In referring to the information fiduciary model, I mean proposals that would cast digital data 













tendrilled project. Indeed, they may cast doubt on any regulatory approach 
that would impose conduct-regulating obligations, fiduciary or not, on 
digital companies since the argument is quite general: that obligating 
corporations to serve users’ interests creates divided loyalties among 
corporate directors enjoined to shareholder loyalty as well. 
But Khan and Pozen are not simply critics. They see the information 
fiduciary model as in direct competition with “more ambitious 
approaches.”19 These approaches could require reform of technology firms’ 
organizational structures. In other work, Khan examines the case for 
separating the operations of Facebook and its ilk,20 suggesting that “full 
structural separation” may be needed21—a strategy requiring the break-up 
of firms, much as Congress famously did to Wall Street firms in the 1930s 
when it separated commercial and investment banks.22 Khan and Pozen 
worry that “if pursued with any real vigor, [the fiduciary approach] would 
tend to cannibalize rather than complement” other regulatory options.23  
If accepted, the critique of the information fiduciary model may have 
sweeping implications, extending beyond major technology firms. Many of 
the largest financial services firms are subject to fiduciary regimes that 
arguably impose dual loyalties, as the information fiduciary model might. 
For example, Delaware-incorporated Goldman Sachs, a financial services 
conglomerate, often acts as a fiduciary for customers, even as its directors 
owe duties of loyalty to shareholders.24 The same is true of Delaware-
incorporated BlackRock, one of the world’s largest asset managers.25 On 
 
actors in order to protect users’ privacy interests. For contributions to this model, see DANIEL J. SOLOVE, 
THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 103–04 (2004); Lindsey 
Barrett, Confiding in Con Men: U.S. Privacy Law, the GDPR, and Information Fiduciaries, 42 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 1057 (2019); Ariel Dobkin, Information Fiduciaries in Practice: Data Privacy and User 
Expectations, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1 (2018); Ian R. Kerr, The Legal Relationship Between Online 
Service Providers and Users, 35 CAN. BUS. L.J. 419, 454–58 (2001); Neil Richards & Woodrow 
Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 431, 457–58 (2016); Neil 
Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Privacy’s Trust Gap: A Review, 126 YALE L.J. 1180, 1213–23 (2017) 
(book review); Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Trusting Big Data Research, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 
579, 588–90 (2017); Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy as Trust: Sharing Personal Information in A 
Networked World, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 559, 600–01 (2015); Jonathan Zittrain, Engineering an Election, 
127 HARV. L. REV. F. 335, 340 (2014); Richard S. Whitt, Old School Goes Online: Exploring Fiduciary 
Obligations of Loyalty and Care in the Digital Platforms Era, 36 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 75 
(2019). 
19. Khan & Pozen, supra note 6, at 536. 
20. Lina M. Khan, The Separation of Platforms and Commerce, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 1065–
85 (2019). 
21. Id. at 1084. 
22. See MICHAEL S. BARR, HOWELL E. JACKSON & MARGARET E. TAHYAR, FINANCIAL 
REGULATION: LAW AND POLICY 51 (2d ed., 2018). 
23. Khan & Pozen, supra note 6, at 537.  
24. See infra notes 133–134 and accompanying text. 
25. The corporation managed $8.68 trillion for its customers as of December 2020. See 
BLACKROCK, INC., ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K), at 1 (Feb. 25, 2021). 











their face, Khan and Pozen’s arguments would seem to extend to these 
fiduciary regimes, with similarly troubling consequences.  
Khan and Pozen argue eloquently and emphatically, but their central 
criticisms significantly overstate the threat that corporate and fiduciary law 
poses for the information fiduciary model. In this Essay, I show that 
imposing user-regarding obligations on corporations will not create 
untenable frictions between duties to users and duties to shareholders. In 
Part I, I argue that the primary criticism—that Delaware corporate law 
undermines the information fiduciary regime—should be dismissed. The 
criticism rests on a partial understanding of corporate law doctrine and 
theory. The criticism sees conflicting obligations where none exist and 
identifies strategies for resolving these apparent conflicts that are unknown 
to corporate law. In fact, the plausible outcome of an information fiduciary 
regime is exactly the opposite of what Khan and Pozen fear. Under the 
information fiduciary model, corporate law would require compliance with 
user-regarding obligations, creating incentives for directors to favor users’ 
interests over those of shareholders. I also argue that Khan and Pozen’s 
arguments are not merely mistaken but, if accepted, may do harm. Applying 
their case to financial conglomerates—more apt analogues for social media 
companies than the “[d]octors, lawyers, accountants, and the like”26 to 
whom scholars often draw their comparison—shows that Khan and Pozen’s 
arguments, if accepted, may have pernicious effects on broad spheres of 
corporate regulation. 
In Part II, I address the other primary objection to the information 
fiduciary model—that the model is incompatible with social media 
companies’ powerful self-interests. The objection reflects twin concerns. 
According to the first, Facebook and other digital companies have such 
powerful self-regarding incentives that these companies may not properly 
be characterized as fiduciaries of their users; such incentives should be seen 
“as an insuperable obstacle to a fiduciary relationship,” Khan and Pozen 
suggest.27 Under the related concern, digital companies could not satisfy 
fiduciary duties unless their business models were fundamentally 
transformed. To impose user-regarding duties on digital companies, Khan 
and Pozen write, “and wind up with anything recognizable as a fiduciary 
relationship, it seems to us that the legislators would have to force 
fundamental changes in the companies’ business practices . . . and preempt 
or dilute the stockholder-regarding norms under which the companies 
currently operate.”28 
 
26. Khan & Pozen, supra note 6, at 506. 
27. Id. at 513. 












Even if one accepts that Facebook’s interests are completely misaligned 
with those of its users—a contestable claim—fiduciary law may be 
adaptable enough to survive such challenges. Fiduciary duties may be, and 
frequently are, imposed on actors with powerful incentives to serve their 
own interests rather than those of their customers. This is because self-
interested incentives themselves are not a barrier to the imposition of 
fiduciary duties. In fact, it is often the very drive to serve self-interest at the 
expense of another that creates the need for fiduciary protection. Financial 
services regulation includes examples of fiduciary law operating in the 
presence of the conflicting interests and tensions much like those that Khan 
and Pozen claim beset the relationships between social media companies 
and their users.  
It is also no barrier to the information fiduciary model to assert that 
digital companies currently fall short of fiduciary standards. To the extent 
Khan and Pozen argue that digital companies cannot now act with fiduciary 
loyalty, this suggests that firms’ existing practices would need to change 
under the force of fiduciary duties, not that fiduciary duties could not be 
imposed. As fiduciaries, digital companies would hardly be unique in 
having powerful self-regarding motivations and relying on business 
practices that create opportunities and incentives for firms to act contrary to 
customers’ interests. 
The concern that these companies could not satisfy fiduciary duties 
without “fundamental changes in the companies’ business practices” is 
similarly overstated. Khan and Pozen do not specify what “fundamental 
changes” may be required under a fiduciary regime, although, importantly, 
they never claim that these firms could not continue to operate or earn 
profits under a strong fiduciary regime. 
Still, Khan and Pozen rightly point to potential tension between the 
business models of major digital companies and the imposition of 
particularly strict fiduciary duties. Such duties may disrupt firms’ business 
models, requiring major changes to their ways of doing business, even 
cutting off certain income streams. If their point is that a particularly strong 
version of fiduciary duties may require significant changes in digital firms’ 
practices, I agree. But the need for such changes should not be seen as 
necessarily undermining the information fiduciary model; it is entirely 
possible that these changes in firms’ practices would be desirable since they 
would be the product of strongly user-protective duties. These changes 
might also be consistent with the “more ambitious approaches” to regulatory 
reform that Khan and Pozen favor.29 Accordingly, if an information 
 
29. Id. at 536; id. at 502 (noting their fear that the information-fiduciary framework “invites an 
enervating complacency about issues of structural power and a premature abandonment of more robust 
visions of public regulation”). 











fiduciary model were to require “fundamental changes” of digital 
companies, this might give Khan and Pozen reason to support, rather than 
oppose, particularly robust fiduciary duties.  
In Part III, I consider the implications of the analysis in Parts I and II. 
The information fiduciary model remains a viable policy option for 
regulating digital data collectors. No fundamental reform of corporate law 
would be required to implement the model. The objections to the fiduciary 
model fail to undermine other spheres of corporate regulation or commonly 
used tools for keeping corporate misconduct in check. 
Importantly, in this Essay I do not seek to promote the information 
fiduciary model so much as to ensure it receives due consideration.30 Once 
one clears away Khan and Pozen’s primary criticisms, the information 
fiduciary model remains subject to various questions about calibration, fit, 
and comparison. Is the model framed too widely or not widely enough? To 
which firms, specifically, would it apply?31 Would it tackle the most severe 
problems posed by digital companies? Would an information fiduciary 
regime be cost-effective? How does it weigh against alternatives? How well 
would it fit with other regulatory strategies? These are reasonable questions, 
many of which Khan and Pozen also consider to varying degrees in response 
to Balkin’s proposal.32 Such questions may equally be asked of other 
proposals, as well. My purpose is not to consider these questions or to 
dismiss discussion of other reforms, including structural solutions. I seek 
instead to ensure that all viable options—including the information 
fiduciary model—remain on the table for consideration and that we do not 
let stand those criticisms that would also have adverse consequences for 
stakeholder protections in other spheres of regulation. 
 
30. Nor do I question whether the model’s concern for greater protective barriers around data 
may in some settings come at the expense of other regulatory goals, such as innovation and competition. 
As to potential tradeoffs in achieving these objectives, see William J. Magnuson & Cesare Fracassi, 
Data Autonomy, 74 VAND. L. REV. 327 (2021). 
31. According to Balkin, writing after Khan and Pozen’s critique, “the fiduciary model applies 
not only to large social media platforms like Facebook but also to all businesses that collect information 
from end users in return for services, whether or not the end user pays fees or has a subscription.” Balkin, 
Fiduciary Model of Privacy, supra note 7, at 17. The model could thus have vast reach, sweeping in 
“bricks and mortar” companies as well as technology companies. Khan and Pozen use the terms “digital 
companies” and “social media companies” interchangeably, without providing definitions, to describe 
the firms to which the information fiduciary model might apply. See, e.g., Khan & Pozen, supra note 6, 
at 499, 502, 509, 521 (referring to “digital companies”); id. at 504, 511, 515, 517, 525, 530 (referring to 
“social media companies”). Khan and Pozen nevertheless give examples of such firms. See, e.g., id. at 
498. 
32. See, e.g., Khan & Pozen, supra note 6, at 526–27 (listing “profound problems” that Balkin’s 












I. CLAIMED TENSION WITH CORPORATE LAW 
This Part assesses Khan and Pozen’s primary criticism of the information 
fiduciaries model, which holds that the model is in tension with Delaware 
corporate law. I reject this criticism, showing that Delaware law aligns with 
the information fiduciary model by creating incentives for compliance with 
a corporation’s obligations.  
A. The Problem of Conflicting Fiduciary Obligations 
Khan and Pozen identify “the problem of conflicting fiduciary 
obligations,”33 “the problem of divided loyalties,”34 or “the issue of 
crosscutting loyalties,”35 which they fault Balkin for “never [having] 
squarely addressed.”36 Using Facebook to illustrate this problem,37 Khan 
and Pozen assert that Balkin’s proposed duties would require Facebook to 
serve users’ interests, while Delaware corporate fiduciary law already 
requires Facebook’s directors to act in shareholders’ interests.38 These 
interests, those of users and shareholders, are in “acute tension[].”39 For 
example, consider that “[b]y and large, addictive user behavior is good for 
[Facebook’s] business” as are “[d]ivisive and inflammatory content” and 
“[d]eterioration of privacy and confidentiality norms.”40 But if Facebook 
were to prioritize users’ interests, the company would “make the site less 
addictive,” “deemphasize sensationalistic material,” and “enhance personal 
privacy.”41 Each of these reforms would “pose a threat to Facebook’s 
bottom line and therefore to the interests of shareholders.”42 Khan and 
Pozen worry that Facebook’s directors will face the “untenable position of 
having to violate their fiduciary duties (to stockholders) under Delaware law 
in order to fulfill their fiduciary duties (to end users) under the new body of 
law that Balkin proposes—at least barring some sort of ‘heavy-handed 
government intervention’ that clearly prioritizes the latter set of duties.”43 
 
33. Khan & Pozen, supra note 6, at 510. 
34. Id. at 507. 
35. Id. at 508. 
36. Id. In faulting Balkin, Khan and Pozen refer specifically to “the issue of crosscutting 
loyalties,” although they also refer to this issue using the expressions above. See supra notes 33 and 34. 
37. See id. at 501 n.14. 
38. Id. at 503–04. 
39. Id. at 506; see also id. at 507 (“The potential conflicts between equity owners and end users 
that arise [at social media companies] are not isolated or incidental but go to the core of the firms’ 
business.”). 
40. Id. at 505. 
41. Id. at 505–06. 
42. Id. at 506. 
43. Id. at 504 (internal footnotes omitted). 











Khan and Pozen claim that “[d]igital information fiduciaries would not 
be unique in facing crosscutting fiduciary obligations.”44 The authors give 
the examples of “a financial servicer acting on behalf of multiple investors 
or a law firm partner with fiduciary duties to her copartners as well as to her 
clients.”45 Still, digital companies like Facebook are specially positioned 
because “[d]octors, lawyers, accountants, and the like do not experience 
such acute tensions within their sets of fiduciary obligations.”46 While this 
problem of conflicting obligations for fiduciaries may be “manage[d],”47 
Khan and Pozen question whether “the same legal strategies” for managing 
conflicts in other settings would “work for digital information fiduciaries.”48 
They ask whether “the duties [digital companies] already owe to 
stockholders” can “be harmonized with the new duties they would owe to 
users without doing too much violence either to the companies themselves 
or to fundamental principles of fiduciary law?”49 
Khan and Pozen’s answer to this question is an emphatic no. Their 
analysis begins by identifying four strategies for trying to reconcile such 
conflicting duties,50 the first two of which they quickly reject. First, they 
reject the possibility that Facebook could permissibly prioritize users’ 
interests, in compliance with Balkin’s duties, over those of shareholders. 
That strategy “runs counter to the prevailing understanding of Delaware 
doctrine.”51 Second, they consider the possibility that social media 
companies might serve users’ interests while also advancing shareholders’ 
interests, “for instance because fostering trust in the present period may 
make it easier to retain and recruit users in future periods.”52 They reject this 
too, arguing, “[t]he fact that corporations like Facebook have persistently 
declined to self-regulate along such lines . . . suggests that their boards do 
not see these reforms [to advance the best interests of users] as likely to 
enhance firm value or shareholder wealth either in the short term or in the 
long term.”53 
Khan and Pozen also appear to dismiss the third strategy as a way for 
managing “the problem of conflicting fiduciary obligations.”54 Under this 
 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 506 (internal footnotes omitted). 
46. Id. at 506. 
47. Id. at 507 (“Within the context of such [fiduciary] relationships, the law is generally able to 
manage the problem of divided loyalties . . . .”). 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 508 (“It is possible to imagine at least four ways one might try to reconcile a corporation 
like Facebook’s fiduciary obligations to stockholders with fiduciary obligations to end users.”). The 
analysis goes on to identify only four such strategies. Id. at 508–10. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. (internal footnote omitted).  












strategy, “corporate law might be modified through state or federal 
legislation to authorize or compel platforms to put users’ interests ahead of 
stockholders’ interests (either in general or in specific respects).”55 Khan 
and Pozen do not pursue this strategy further, noting that advocates of the 
information-fiduciary concept have not suggested the need to reform 
corporate law to give effect to the information fiduciary proposal.56  
Barring such reform of corporate law, Khan and Pozen see “a fourth and 
final strategy” for managing the problem57: Balkin’s duties would yield to 
directors’ duties.58 Under this strategy, “any fiduciary duties afforded to 
users” would be “cabin[ed] . . . so that they do not seriously threaten firm 
value.”59 To Khan and Pozen, “it seems that Facebook, Google, and Twitter 
would, as a rule, have to temper their duties to users with a higher duty of 
loyalty to shareholders. Delaware law would remain unaffected. The 
interests of shareholders would still come first.”60 Accordingly, Khan and 
Pozen contend, this strategy would “mitigate the problem of conflicting 
fiduciary obligations and purchase legal coherence—but at a steep price. 
For if the concept of digital information fiduciaries does not require online 
platforms to place their users’ interests above all other interests, it is unclear 
what work the concept is supposed to be doing.”61 “More than this,” Khan 
and Pozen write, “it is unclear how this is a fiduciary approach in any 
 
55. Khan & Pozen, supra note 6, at 509. Here, Khan and Pozen have in mind reform of corporate 
law specifically. Elsewhere, Khan and Pozen are less specific, referring to law reform generally but 
without ruling out reform of corporate law. See id. at 504 (asserting that the problem of conflicting 
obligations might be resolved by “some sort of ‘heavy-handed government intervention’ that clearly 
prioritizes the latter set of duties [owed to users]” (internal footnote omitted); id. at 534 (“The tension 
between what it would take to implement a fiduciary duty of loyalty to users, on the one hand, and these 
companies’ economic incentives and duties to shareholders, on the other, is too deep to resolve without 
fundamental reform.”). 
56. Id. at 509 (“At no point has Balkin or Zittrain indicated that their proposal would require 
modification of companies’ existing fiduciary duties to accommodate new duties to users.”). 
57. Id. at 509. To Khan and Pozen, “information-fiduciary advocates generally appear to 
endorse” this fourth strategy to mitigate “the problem of conflicting fiduciary obligations.” Id. Earlier, 
they fault information-fiduciary advocates for never having “squarely addressed” the problem. Id. at 
508. Based on this Essay’s analysis, it seems more plausible that information-fiduciary advocates never 
believed that “problem” needed mitigation than that they endorsed this fourth strategy. See Sections I.B–
I.D. 
58. Id. at 509–10 (arguing that “the problem of conflicting fiduciary obligations” may be 
managed by “cabin[ing] any fiduciary duties afforded to users so that they do not seriously threaten firm 
value—and thus might even be implemented by judges in the absence of legislation”). 
59. Id. at 509. 
60. Id. The claim is conditional: “If traditional professional fiduciaries must temper their duties 
to any other beneficiaries with a higher duty of loyalty to patients and clients,” then digital companies 
“would, as a rule, have to temper their duties to users.” Id. However, earlier analysis asserts the truth of 
this condition. See id. at 507 (“Within the context of such [‘traditional’ fiduciary] relationships, the law 
is generally able to manage the problem of divided loyalties by requiring fiduciaries to minimize self-
dealing and obvious conflicts . . . and, above all, to prioritize the interests of clients and patients over 
the fiduciary’s own interests and the interests of any other beneficiaries.”).  
61. Id. at 510. 












It follows that Balkin’s proposal would, if implemented, codify a 
“watered-down version of fiduciary responsibility.”63 Moreover, the tension 
between Balkin’s proposal, on the one hand, and “digital companies’ 
economic incentives and duties to shareholders, on the other, is too deep to 
resolve without fundamental reform. To suggest otherwise is to risk 
mystification of ‘surveillance capitalism,’ entrenchment of prevailing 
business models, and legitimation of a wide range of troubling practices, if 
not also the unraveling of fiduciary law itself.”64 
B. Fiduciary Duties Owed by Whom? 
Facing such strident criticism from prominent scholars, Balkin’s 
proposal and the information fiduciary model more generally face doubt. 
There is also concern that other approaches for regulating digital companies 
would result in conflicts with corporate law’s duties.65 And yet Khan and 
Pozen’s analysis is mistaken in key ways. 
Importantly, Khan and Pozen frequently confuse, or mistake, the 
identities of the fiduciaries themselves. In particular, the analysis elides the 
difference between corporations and their directors, an oversight that allows 
Khan and Pozen readily to see conflicting obligations under Balkin’s 
proposal. Khan and Pozen wrongly claim that corporate law imposes 
fiduciary duties on Facebook, duties conflicting with those duties Balkin 
would also impose on Facebook. For example, Khan and Pozen ask, “Can 
the duties they [information fiduciaries] already owe to stockholders be 
harmonized with the new duties they [information fiduciaries] would owe 
to users”?66 Similarly, Khan and Pozen consider ways in which it is possible 
to “reconcile a corporation like Facebook’s fiduciary obligations to 
stockholders with fiduciary obligations to end users.”67 In more recent 
remarks critical of Balkin’s idea, Pozen is quoted as saying, “[f]or this idea 
that platforms such as Facebook and Google should owe fiduciary 
obligations to their users, I’d first note that the platforms already owe 
 
62. Id.  
63. Id. at 535. 
64. Id. at 534–35 (internal footnote omitted). 
65. See text accompanying notes 17–19. 
66. Khan & Pozen, supra note 6, at 507 (emphasis added).  
67. Id. at 508 (emphasis added). For another example, see id. at 534–35 (“The tension between 
what it would take to implement a fiduciary duty of loyalty to users, on the one hand, and these 
companies’ economic incentives and duties to shareholders, on the other, is too deep to resolve without 












fiduciary obligations to their stockholders.”68 At other times, Khan and 
Pozen’s critique asserts the opposite, wrongly claiming that Balkin would 
impose fiduciary duties on Facebook’s directors, duties conflicting with 
those that corporate law already imposes on directors. For example, Khan 
and Pozen worry that “the officers and directors of these [social media] 
companies may . . . hav[e] to violate their fiduciary duties (to stockholders) 
under Delaware law in order to fulfill their fiduciary duties (to end users)” 
under the proposed information fiduciary model.69 Readers of the critique 
would be forgiven for believing that Balkin’s proposal would result in 
particular fiduciaries—whether social media companies or their directors—
laboring under two sets of obligations, each set requiring service of differing 
interests that are in conflict.  
But this analysis misconstrues both corporate law and Balkin’s proposal. 
Corporate law imposes its duties on directors, not corporations,70 while 
Balkin would impose duties on corporations, not directors.71 To be sure, 
when directors act collectively as the board of directors, they make 
decisions for the corporation, and directors individually may act on behalf 
of a corporation if they are invested with the authority to do so.72 
Nevertheless, corporate law carefully distinguishes between corporations 
 
68. Andy Fitch, They Are Not Your Fiduciaries: Talking to David Pozen, L.A. REVIEW OF 
BOOKS: BLOG (Jan. 31, 2020), https://blog.lareviewofbooks.org/interviews/fiduciaries-talking-david-po 
zen/ [https://perma.cc/MW7F-FDAB].  
69. Khan & Pozen, supra note 6, at 504 (emphasis added). For another example, see id. at 508 
(considering and rejecting the possibility that “a Facebook director’s duties to stockholders could simply 
be subordinated to her duties to users [under Balkin’s proposal] when the two collide”) (emphasis 
added). 
70. In re Comverge, No. 7368, 2014 WL 6686570, at *8 n.19 (Del. Ch. Nov. 25, 2014) (“Under 
settled Delaware law, however, [f]iduciary duties are owed by the directors and officers to the 
corporation and its shareholders. In other words, a corporation does not owe fiduciary duties to its 
stockholders.” (omitting internal quotation marks) (quoting Buttonwood Tree Value Partners, L.P. v. 
R.L Polk & Co., No. 9250, 2014 WL 3954987, at *4 (Del. Ch. Aug. 7, 2014))); see also Arnold v. Soc’y 
for Savs. Bancorp, Inc., 678 A.2d 533, 539 (Del. 1996) (“Plaintiff has not cited a single case in which 
Delaware courts have held a corporation directly liable for breach of the fiduciary duty of disclosure. 
Fiduciary duties are owed by the directors and officers to the corporation and its stockholders.”). 
71. See, e.g., Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 4, at 1221 (“I do not claim that 
Facebook or Uber is managing my estate, or is my accountant, my doctor, or my lawyer. What I do claim 
is that in the digital age, because we trust them with sensitive information, certain types of online service 
providers take on fiduciary responsibilities.”); see also id. at 1225 (“By suggesting that online service 
providers are information fiduciaries, I have been analogizing these companies to traditional 
professional fiduciaries like doctors or lawyers.”) (emphasis added); id. (referring to “digital information 
fiduciaries like Uber, Facebook, and Google”); id. at 1222–24 (proposing fiduciary duties on “online 
service providers,” referred to also as “digital organizations,” “companies” and “entities”); Balkin, Big 
Data Law and Policy, supra note 4, at 1228 (“The digital age has created a new set of entities that have 
many features similar to traditional fiduciaries. They include large online businesses like Google, 
Facebook, and Uber.”). 
72. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. f.(2) (AM. LAW. INST. 2006). 











and the individuals who direct them, imposing fiduciary duties only on the 
latter.73  
Recall Khan and Pozen’s arguments that “the problem of conflicting 
fiduciary obligations” also arises in other settings but that this problem 
cannot be “managed” nearly as successfully for digital companies as it is 
elsewhere.74 A problem of conflicting fiduciary obligations may exist, 
although this typically occurs when a single fiduciary owes sets of 
inconsistent obligations.75 In the financial services industry, for example, a 
corporate fiduciary may owe conflicting fiduciary obligations when it has 
obligations to two distinct clients with competing interests.76 The nation’s 
largest financial institutions provide myriad services—often as 
fiduciaries—to their clients and, therefore, often owe conflicting fiduciary 
obligations.77  
The “problem” Khan and Pozen point to, however, occurs routinely and 
differs from the conflicts that may afflict a single fiduciary. Under Balkin’s 
proposal, fiduciary obligations would be imposed on distinct actors: each 
fiduciary—corporations under Balkin’s proposal and directors under 
Delaware corporate law—is bound by a single set of fiduciary obligations. 
This “problem” is routine; it arises whenever fiduciary obligations are 
imposed on a Delaware corporation. For instance, it occurs in the financial 
services industry when Goldman Sachs or BlackRock act as investment 
advisers (and therefore as fiduciaries to customers).78 Khan and Pozen offer 
no reason to doubt that the “problem” afflicting social media companies is 
any different.  
 
73. Since Delaware law imposes fiduciary duties on directors for the benefit of corporations and 
their shareholders, directors serve as fiduciaries of corporations. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum 
Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (“[T]he board’s power to act derives from its fundamental duty and 
obligation to protect the corporate enterprise, which includes stockholders . . . .”); see also Guth v. Loft, 
Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (“While technically not trustees, they [directors] stand in a fiduciary 
relation to the corporation and its stockholders.”). See also supra note 70. 
74. See supra note 46–48and accompanying text. 
75. Khan and Pozen give examples of a single fiduciary owing multiple sets of obligations. See 
supra note 46 and accompanying text. Khan and Pozen do observe in passing that some of these 
fiduciaries “may even be employed by publicly traded companies, although most are not,” Khan & 
Pozen, supra note 6, at 506 (internal footnote omitted), although they do not explore the relevance of 
this possibility. 
76. The literature recognizing conflicting fiduciary duties is voluminous. For early recognition 
of the issue, see, for example, Martin Lipton & Robert B. Mazur, The Chinese Wall Solution to the 
Conflict Problems of Securities Firms, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 459 (1975); Note, Conflicting Duties of 
Brokerage Firms, 88 HARV. L. REV. 396 (1974). The issue is not unique to corporations. See, e.g., John 
Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory of Investment Fund Structure and 
Regulation, 123 YALE L.J. 1228, 1261–62 (2014). 
77. See, e.g., Andrew F. Tuch, Financial Conglomerates and Information Barriers, 39 J. CORP. 
L. 563, 572–78 (2014) [hereinafter Tuch, Financial Conglomerates]; Andrew F. Tuch, The Weakening 
of Fiduciary Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW 354, 356–60 (D. Gordon Smith & 
Andrew S. Gold eds., 2018) [hereinafter Tuch, Weakening of Fiduciary Law]. 












When this “problem” occurs, that is, when fiduciary obligations are 
imposed on a Delaware corporation, do those duties conflict with directors’ 
duties, as Khan and Pozen assert in the social media setting, or otherwise 
undermine the information fiduciary model? Under Balkin’s proposal, it is 
readily apparent that corporations face no conflicting fiduciary obligations 
since they would be bound by a single set of fiduciary obligations (to users). 
Directors are also bound by a single set of fiduciary obligations (to their 
corporation), and yet their position might seem more complicated because 
their obligations to the corporation require them to serve shareholders’ 
interests and may therefore be seen as conflicting with proposed obligations 
on the corporation to serve users’ interests. But, as explained next, Delaware 
corporate law does not put directors in such a position of conflict. 
C. The Risk of Directorial Breach 
In considering whether digital companies’ directors face conflicting 
fiduciary obligations, recall how this conflict-of-duties problem is said to 
arise: “officers and directors of these companies may be put in the untenable 
position of having to violate their fiduciary duties (to stockholders) under 
Delaware law in order to fulfill their fiduciary duties (to end users)” under 
Balkin’s proposed regime.79 Central to perceived conflict is the risk of 
liability for directors when they attempt to ensure compliance with the 
corporation’s “fiduciary duties (to end users)” under the information 
fiduciary model.80  
Khan and Pozen rightly note that Delaware corporate law is 
conventionally understood as adopting the norm of shareholder primacy, or 
profit maximization, and that the law therefore requires directors to pursue 
the end of shareholder wealth maximization.81 Importantly, even under the 
shareholder primacy approach, directors may take into account and serve 
non-shareholder interests, such as customer or employee interests, to the 
 
79. Khan & Pozen, supra note 6, at 504. 
80. Id. 
81. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“Having chosen 
a for-profit corporate form, the [corporation’s] directors are bound by the fiduciary duties and standards 
that accompany that form. Those standards include acting to promote the value of the corporation for 
the benefit of shareholders”); see also Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-
Eyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General 
Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 773 (2015) (Delaware law permits directors to 
consider the interests of non-shareholder constituencies, such as users, but only “[a]s a means to the end 
of increasing stockholder welfare . . . and not as an end”); id. at 771 (directors may have regard to non-
shareholder interests “instrumentally, . . . when giving consideration to them can be justified as 
benefiting the stockholders”).  











extent that doing so promotes shareholder value.82 In other words, 
shareholder primacy does not forbid corporate leaders from taking into 
account or serving non-shareholder interests. Indeed, shareholder primacy 
requires directors to serve non-shareholder interests when doing so will 
maximize long-term shareholder value.83 Khan and Pozen seem on board 
with this starting position.84 
However, from this point Khan and Pozen’s analysis goes astray, 
interpreting directors’ duties too strictly, seeing real risk that directors will 
violate their duties to maximize shareholder value if, as required by Balkin’s 
proposal, they (or the corporation) act in users’ interests.85 This view is 
hyperbolic on its face, as clarified by the above-described complications 
inherent in the shareholder wealth maximization doctrine.86 But the analysis 
is wrong for other reasons, too. First, Delaware law takes a broad view of 
shareholder interests: the relevant shareholders are not current shareholders; 
they are “(hypothetical) stockholders who have entrusted their capital to the 
firm indefinitely.”87 Shareholders’ interests are therefore often equated with 
the long-term interests of either potential shareholders or the corporation.88 
Never in Delaware law are shareholders’ interests equated with the 
corporation’s immediate profitability to the exclusion of long-term 
 
82. Although this view—which allows corporate leaders to take into account non-shareholder 
interests as instruments for maximizing shareholder value—is sometimes referred to as enlightened 
shareholder value, it is conceptually identical to shareholder primacy as conventionally understood. See 
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance, 106 
CORNELL L. REV. 91, 110 (2020) (“Whenever treating stakeholders well in a given way would be useful 
for long-term shareholder value, such treatment would be called for under either enlightened shareholder 
value or ‘old-fashioned’ shareholder value.”). 
83. See id. at 109 (“It is thus unsurprising that maximizing long-term value for shareholders 
requires paying close attention to the effects of the company’s operations on stakeholders. . . . [I]t is 
undeniable that, to effectively serve the goal of enhancing long-term shareholder value, corporate leaders 
should take into account stakeholder effects—as they should consider any other relevant factors.”). 
84. Khan & Pozen, supra note 6, at 503 (“[D]irectors ‘must, within the limits of [their] legal 
discretion, treat stockholder welfare as the only end, considering other interests only to the extent that 
doing so is rationally related to stockholder welfare.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Frederick Hsu 
Living Tr. v. ODN Holding Corp., No. 12108, 2017 WL 1437308, at *17 (Del. Ch. Apr. 24, 2017)). 
However, Khan and Pozen later assert the opposite as the “conventional” position, without attempting 
to reconcile the contrary positions. See Khan & Pozen, supra note 6, at 504 (“Delaware fiduciary law 
simply ‘does not permit traditional corporations to consider non-stockholder constituencies.’” (citation 
omitted)). 
85. See Khan & Pozen, supra note 6, at 505–06. 
86. See supra notes 82–83. 
87. Strine, supra note 81, at 774 (attributing the view to Delaware Chancellor William Allen). 
88. See TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., Nos. 10427, 10298, 1989 WL 20290, at *7 
(Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989); Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 82, at 109. Moreover, shareholders themselves 
have often advocated for corporations to take public-regarding actions rather than strictly to promote the 
corporation’s financial interests. See Cathy Hwang & Yaron Nili, Shareholder-Driven Stakeholderism, 
U. CHIC. L. REV. ONLINE (Apr. 15, 2020), https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/2020/04/15/shareholder-












interests,89 as Khan and Pozen suggest by focusing on the “bottom line” 
effects of directors’ decisions.90 Second, directors’ decisions are protected 
by the business judgment rule, a bedrock of Delaware corporate law, which 
immunizes directors from judicial review91 and therefore liability by 
presuming that directors “acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in 
the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the 
company.”92 The doctrine is rarely rebutted.93 Under this doctrine, courts 
defer to directors’ perceptions of shareholders’ interests rather than identify 
those interests themselves. Delaware corporate law is therefore said to give 
“directors . . . wide leeway to pursue the best interests of stockholders as 
they perceive them.”94 
Accordingly, directors seldom face liability for fiduciary breach for 
failure to maximize shareholder value. Realistically, only when directors 
admit that their decisions were not intended to maximize shareholder value 
may liability arise.95 Extreme facts would be required, as illustrated by the 
iconic Michigan decision early last century of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,96 
 
89. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 18 n.46 (1986) (regarding it as a “serious 
conceptual mistake” to treat the corporate purpose as requiring a “focus only on short-run results”); 
Edward Rock, For Whom is the Corporation Managed in 2020?: The Debate over Corporate Purpose 
12 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 515/2020, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=358995 
1 [https://perma.cc/M67Q-6DHX] (“[T]here is nothing in the Delaware conception of ‘shareholder 
primacy’ that mandates that directors choose short term share price maximization over long term value 
creation or that mandates paying employees the minimum salary necessary or charging customers the 
highest price that the market will bear.”). Nor do scholars even argue that corporations should be run to 
promote shareholder interests while disregarding other stakeholder interests. See Henry Hansmann & 
Reinier Kraakman, Essay, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 441 (2001); Ann 
M. Lipton, Not Everything Is About Investors: The Case for Mandatory Stakeholder Disclosure, 37 
YALE J. ON REGUL. 499, 504 (2020). 
90. See Khan & Pozen, supra note 6, at 506.  
91. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (“A hallmark of the 
business judgment rule is that a court will not substitute its judgment for that of the board if the latter’s 
decision can be attributed to any rational business purpose.” (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted)). 
92. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. 
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
93. To rebut the presumption, a plaintiff carries a heavy burden. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. 
Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1279 (Del. 1988).  
94. Strine, supra note 81 at 773. Strine observes that directors’ position is different in change-
of-control transactions like corporate mergers. Id.; see also Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits 
in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 738 (2005) (“Corporate managers have never had an 
enforceable legal duty to maximize corporate profits. Rather, they have always had some legal discretion 
(implicit or explicit) to sacrifice corporate profits in the public interest.”); Jill E. Fisch & Steven Davidoff 
Solomon, Should Corporations Have a Purpose?, TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 103) 
(available at https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/2163) (“[C]ommentators widely 
agree that shareholder primacy affords managers substantial latitude to consider the interests of non-
shareholder constituencies . . . .”). 
95. Strine, supra note 81, at 776–77 (“[I]f a fiduciary admits that he is treating an interest other 
than stockholder wealth as an end in itself, rather than an instrument to stockholder wealth, he is 
committing a breach of fiduciary duty.”). 
96. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 











arising from Ford’s decision to stop paying special dividends to 
shareholders as it expanded its business and lowered the price of its cars. 
The company’s chief executive officer and majority shareholder Henry Ford 
admitted on cross-examination that the company was “[o]rganized to do as 
much good as we can, everywhere, for everybody concerned. . . . And 
incidentally to make money.”97 Ford tried to convince the court that “he 
thinks the Ford Motor Company has made too much money, has had too 
large profits, and that, although large profits might be still earned, a sharing 
of them with the public . . . ought to be undertaken.”98 The court intervened, 
a remarkable decision that later courts explained on the basis that directors 
had committed fraud or bad faith, thereby rebutting the business judgment 
rule.99 This century-old decision is believed to be the only instance outside 
the corporate-takeover context in which the shareholder primacy norm had 
bite, leading a court to fault directors for failing to maximize shareholder 
value.100 Delaware’s most relevant authority contains a similar admission 
by directors, who “prove[d] that they personally believe[d] [the company] 
should not be about the business of stockholder wealth maximization, now 
or in the future.”101 
Scholars underscore how rarely directors face liability for failure to 
maximize shareholder value. Stephen Bainbridge regards shareholder 
primacy as “no more than an exhortation. The court may hold forth on the 
primacy of shareholder interests. . . , but ultimately it does not matter. . . . 
[D]irectors who consider nonshareholder interests in making corporate 
decisions, like directors who do not, will be insulated from liability by the 
business judgment rule.”102 Lynn Stout opines that the business judgment 
rule will “shield directors from liability . . . so long as any plausible 
connection can be made between the directors’ decision and some possible 
 
97. J. MARK RAMSEYER, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 110 (2012). 
98. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 683–84. 
99. See, e.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 779–80 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (“From the 
authority relied upon in that case it is clear that the court felt [in Dodge v. Ford] that there must be fraud 
or a breach of that good faith which directors are bound to exercise toward the stockholders in order to 
justify the courts entering into the internal affairs of corporations.”). 
100. Jonathan R. Macey, A Close Reading of an Excellent Commentary on Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. 
L. & BUS. REV. 177, 180 (2008).  
101. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010). The case 
concerned the permissibility of a rights plan (a measure designed to thwart corporate takeover) adopted 
by the board of Delaware-incorporated craigslist, Inc, and so deals with corporate takeovers, a setting 
that raises distinct considerations from those presently relevant. Chancellor Chandler rejected “a 
corporate policy that specifically, clearly, and admittedly seeks not to maximize the economic value of 
a for-profit Delaware corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.” Id. Directors’ decision to adopt a 
rights plan amounted to fiduciary breach. See id. at 35. 












future benefit, however intangible and unlikely, to shareholders.”103 
Jonathan Macey agrees, observing  
there are no cases other than Dodge v. Ford that actually 
operationalize the rule that corporations must maximize profits. The 
goal of profit maximization is to corporate law what observations 
about the weather are in ordinary conversation. Everybody talks 
about it, including judges, but with the lone exception of Dodge v. 
Ford, nobody actually does anything about it.104 
Accordingly, Khan and Pozen are mistaken in seeing real risk that 
directors will violate their duties to maximize shareholder value if, as 
required by Balkin’s proposal, directors (or the corporation) act in users’ 
interests. The critique fails to recognize the leeway courts give directors to 
determine themselves what will promote shareholders’ interests and gives 
no credit to the business judgment rule, omitting it from analysis. The 
critique also overlooks the rarity with which such liability arises. In short, 
the likelihood of fiduciary breach that Khan and Pozen point to in claiming 
tension between Balkin’s proposal and corporate law is theoretically remote 
and, in practical terms, nonexistent. Indeed, every indication is that directors 
under Balkin’s regime could comply with the information fiduciary model 
with little fear of liability under Delaware corporate law. 
None of this is to say that directors generally face weak fiduciary 
constraints under Delaware law. Directors owe a distinct and freestanding 
duty of loyalty, which limits directorial self-dealing transactions, subjecting 
them to rigorous fairness review.105 These duties are not infrequently 
targeted by top plaintiff law firms, especially in transactions with a high risk 
of self-dealing.106 But Khan and Pozen’s analysis does not implicate these 
duties of loyalty.107  
Even if directors would face no real risk of fiduciary breach under duties 
requiring shareholder wealth maximization, might Delaware law 
nevertheless create incentives for directors to seek to maximize shareholder 
 
103. Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163, 
170–71 (2008); see also id. at 171 (“If the directors lack the imagination to offer such a ‘long-run’ 
rationalization for their decision, courts will invent one.”). 
104. Macey, supra note 100, at 180. 
105. Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 466 (Del. 1991). As to the duty of loyalty, see generally 
Andrew F. Tuch, Reassessing Self-Dealing: Between No Conflict and Fairness, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 
939, 951–58 (2019).  
106. See Adam B. Badawi & David H. Webber, Does the Quality of the Plaintiffs’ Law Firm 
Matter in Deal Litigation?, 41 J. CORP. L. 359, 372 (2015); Matthew D. Cain, Jill E. Fisch, Steven 
Davidoff Solomon & Randall S. Thomas, Mootness Fees, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1777, 1814–15 (2019).  
107. Khan and Pozen often refer to the “duty of loyalty” in their analysis. See, e.g., Khan & Pozen, 
supra note 6, at 509. But they are not referring to fiduciary constraints on self-dealing transactions, since 
they do not mention these transactions or other circumstances calling for fairness review. 











value, given the broadly expressed requirement to do so, in violation of an 
information fiduciary regime? If so, corporate law might be in tension with 
Balkin’s proposal, though not for the reasons Khan and Pozen claim.  
Although Khan and Pozen do not consider this argument, it may capture 
their concern about diverging user and shareholder interests. It may be that, 
enjoined to comply with the general requirement to maximize shareholder 
value and to consider users’ interests only in service of that goal, directors 
will act contrary to users’ interests, even if they would face no realistic 
chance of personal liability for failing to do so. I address this argument in 
the next section, showing why it also fails. This argument ignores that 
complying with users’ interests under Balkin’s proposal would be legally 
obliged. It is one thing for directors to prefer shareholders’ interests over 
those of users to the extent they diverge; it is another for directors to elide 
users’ interests when the company is legally obliged to serve them.  
D. The Requirement to Act Within the Law 
Fundamentally, Delaware law altogether avoids tension with regimes 
such as Balkin’s. Delaware corporate law requires directors to exercise their 
discretion within legal limits imposed on the corporation;108 it does not 
license or excuse non-compliance with corporate obligations, even if 
directors believe that doing so would maximize shareholder value.109 And 
Delaware law offers no suggestion that a corporation’s duties or 
responsibilities should be diluted or otherwise shaped by the content of 
directors’ duties. Instead, case law indicates that directors must act “within 
 
108. Khan and Pozen appear to note this requirement, that is, the notion that directors must 
exercise their discretion within legal limits imposed on the corporation. Id. at 503 (“[T]o act loyally, 
officers and directors ‘must, within the limits of [their] legal discretion, treat stockholder welfare as the 
only end . . . .’” (citation omitted)); id. at 506–07 (“Delaware law allows for directors’ duties to 
shareholders to be qualified by other legal duties . . . .”). However, Khan and Pozen’s analysis takes no 
account of this requirement. First, they immediately cut back against the possibility that directors’ duties 
might be so “qualified by other legal duties,” observing that “the nature and scope of the conflicts they 
[directors] would face seem qualitatively distinct.” Id. at 507. Second, they take a position fundamentally 
at odds with this requirement when they reject the proposition that under Delaware law, Facebook could 
permissibly prioritize users’ interests, in compliance with Balkin’s duties, over those of shareholders. 
Id. at 508. Wrongly, they state that the proposition “runs counter to the prevailing understanding of 
Delaware doctrine.” Id. Third, the analytical approach Khan and Pozen adopt, summarized in Section 
I.A.—identifying “the problem of conflicting fiduciary obligations,” examining “strategies” for 
managing or mitigating that “problem,” and settling on the strategy of digital companies “as a rule, 
hav[ing] to temper their duties to users with a higher duty of loyalty to shareholders”—is antithetical to 
this requirement.  
109. For example, the business judgment rule would not endorse or protect directors acting in 












the law.”110 As the Delaware Chancery Court once put it, “one cannot act 
loyally as a corporate director by causing the corporation to violate the 
positive laws it is obliged to obey.”111 On another occasion, the Delaware 
Chancery Court explained, “a fiduciary may not choose to manage an entity 
in an illegal fashion, even if the fiduciary believes that the illegal activity 
will result in profits for the entity.”112 According to former Chief Justice 
Leo Strine and distinguished coauthors, “American corporate law embeds 
law compliance within the very mission of the corporation. Loyalty to the 
corporation’s obligation as a citizen to attempt in good faith to abide by the 
law is not incidental to a director’s duties, it is fundamental.”113 Reflecting 
corporate law’s attitude toward legal compliance, former Harvard Law 
Dean Robert Clark identifies the corporation’s purpose as to “maximize the 
value of the company’s shares, subject to the constraint that the corporation 
must meet all its legal obligations to others who are related to or affected by 
it.”114 
To be sure, there is scholarly debate about the desirability of corporate 
law’s inflexible approach to lawbreaking.115 And there is a range of 
perspectives on the extent to which corporations—like individuals—in fact 
 
110. TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., Nos. 10427, 10298, 1989 WL 20290, at *7 (Del. 
Ch. Mar. 2, 1989). This requirement to act within the law may be understood as an internal constraint 
on directors’ loyalty mandate. See Andrew S. Gold, Pernicious Loyalty, 62 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1187, 
1208 (2021). Professor Gold’s notion of “pernicious loyalty,” the idea that directors and other fiduciaries 
seeking to satisfy their duties of loyalty may harm beneficiaries and third parties, offers no comfort to 
Khan and Pozen; Gold never suggests that directors’ duties may require them to act contrary to the 
corporation’s obligations, but argues the opposite. See id. at 1196–98, 1208. Nor does Professor Gold 
suggest directors’ duties license or excuse non-compliance with corporate obligations. Some scholars 
nevertheless observe that “it is not obvious that corporate law should hold directors accountable simply 
for deciding that the corporation’s interests are served by violating a particular statute.” Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Star Lopez & Benjamin Oklan, The Convergence of Good Faith and Oversight, 55 UCLA 
L. REV. 559, 593 (2008). See also Gold, supra note 110, at 1198. 
111. Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003); see also Desimone v. Barrows, 
924 A.2d 908, 934–35 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“Delaware corporate law has long been clear on this rather 
obvious notion; namely, that it is utterly inconsistent with one's duty of fidelity to the corporation to 
consciously cause the corporation to act unlawfully. The knowing use of illegal means to pursue profit 
for the corporation is director misconduct.” (internal footnotes omitted)). 
112. Metro Commc’n Corp. BVI v. Advanced Mobilecomm Techs. Inc., 854 A.2d 121, 131 (Del. 
Ch. 2004); see also Leo E. Strine, Jr., Lawrence A. Hamermesh, R. Franklin Balotti & Jeffrey M. Gorris, 
Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 651 
(2010) (“Law compliance . . . comes ahead of profit-seeking as a matter of the corporation’s mission, 
and directors owe a duty of loyalty to that hierarchy.”); Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Disobedience, 68 
DUKE L.J. 709, 722 (2019) (“Legal compliance is a first-order requirement; profit-seeking follows in the 
hierarchy of the business corporation’s mission.”). 
113. Strine et al., supra note 112, at 653 n.71. 
114. CLARK, supra note 89, at 17–18. 
115. Notably, Elizabeth Pollman discusses the complexity of lawbreaking by corporations, 
recognizing that some corporate lawbreaking may have social value. Pollman, supra note 112, at 718 
(“Examining corporate disobedience reveals that there is a wide array of lawbreaking . . . . This Article 
aims . . . to suggest that, to the extent that innovation or legal change can benefit society, some corporate 
disobedience could at least have the potential to provide value.”). See also supra note 110. 











comply with their legal obligations.116 But there is no debate as to what 
Delaware law requires of directors. Even the most ardent advocates of 
shareholder primacy have not suggested that corporate law requires, or 
should require, corporations or directors to maximize shareholder value in 
violation of a corporation’s legal obligations. For example, economist 
Milton Friedman, who is often credited with espousing the notion of 
shareholder primacy,117 identified the corporation’s purpose as “to use its 
resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as 
it stays within the rules of the game.”118  
Contrary to Khan and Pozen’s analysis, therefore, corporate law would 
not create a “problem of conflicting fiduciary obligations” or create 
incentives for directors to serve shareholders’ interests over other interests 
protected by legal obligations imposed on the corporation. Nor would 
corporate law create incentives for directors to prefer shareholders’ interests 
over users’ interests under the information fiduciary model to the extent 
those interests diverged. To be sure, shareholders’ and users’ interests may 
well diverge, but when corporations are obliged to serve users’ interests, as 
they would be under the information fiduciary model, directors’ duties 
would require service of those interests even where shareholders’ interests 
differ. The corporation’s obligations require nothing less. Accordingly, if 
Khan and Pozen are correct in suggesting that social media companies like 
Facebook have not adopted “reforms to advance the best interests of users” 
because “their boards do not see these reforms as likely to enhance firm 
value or shareholder wealth,”119 then one solution would be to impose 
obligations on these corporations, perhaps along the lines that Balkin has 
proposed. Directors would then be obliged to act within these constraints. 
Delaware law not only provides no room for directors to operate in the 
way Khan and Pozen fear they will, the law also affirmatively seeks to 
prevent directors from reneging on obligations. Delaware law exposes 
directors to liability if they intentionally violate the corporation’s 
obligations. A director who “acts with the intent to violate applicable 
positive law, or . . . [who] intentionally fails to act in the face of a known 
duty to act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for his duties” may fail to 
 
116. The notion of optimal deterrence in the economic analysis of law even regards some 
lawbreaking as not worth eliminating. As to the theory, see STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 473–91 (2004).  
117. See Brian R. Cheffins, Stop Blaming Milton Friedman!, 98 WASH U. L. REV. 1607, 1611 
(2021) (asserting that Milton Friedman is given “substantial blame (or credit) for the ascendance of 
shareholder value in public companies”). Professor Cheffins argues that it is wrong to ascribe the rise of 
shareholder primacy to Friedman. Id.  
118. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG., Sept. 13, 1970 (§ 6), at 126 (quoting his book CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM). 












act in good faith and thereby face liability for fiduciary breach.120 It is no 
excuse to claim that disregarding the corporation’s obligations nevertheless 
increased profits.121 Corporate fiduciary law thus creates incentives for 
directors to ensure corporations comply with their obligations.122 These 
incentives would apply to compliance with obligations under the 
information fiduciary model as well.  
Distinguishing between directors and corporations helps explain this 
approach to legal compliance. In Delaware, corporations may be formed “to 
conduct or promote any lawful business or purposes.”123 In service of a 
corporation, directors may not exercise authority that the corporation itself 
lacks,124 and they are therefore constrained by corporations’ own legal 
constraints. Moreover, it makes no sense that corporate law would require 
a fiduciary to make decisions violating obligations owed by its beneficiary 
(the corporation) in the name of serving that beneficiary’s interests. 
Similarly, it makes no sense that a beneficiary’s obligations (such as those 
under the information fiduciary model) would be diluted in an attempt to 
manage apparent conflict between those obligations and the fiduciary’s 
obligations to that beneficiary.  
In sum, corporate law has already accounted for just about every concern 
Khan and Pozen raise. Directors would not be stuck between a rock and a 
hard place under the information fiduciary model. They would not have to 
fear liability due to carrying out the corporation’s obligations to users. Nor 
is it the case that obligations to users would be weakened because they 
would be superseded by directors’ duties to serve shareholders’ interests. 
Quite the opposite. By threatening directors with liability for conscious 
disregard of known duties, Delaware law would create incentives for 
 
120. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006) (quoting In re Walt 
Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch. 2005)); see also Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 
362, 369–70 (Del. 2006) (“The failure to act in good faith may result in liability [for directors] because 
the requirement to act in good faith ‘is a subsidiary element[,]’ i.e., a condition, ‘of the fundamental duty 
of loyalty.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 
2003))). 
121. See supra notes 112–113 and accompanying text. 
122. While scholars debate the effectiveness of directors’ duties in deterring corporate 
misconduct, recent cases—in which “Caremark claims” (alleging failures of board oversight) have 
survived motions to dismiss—suggest that fiduciary doctrine incentivizes directors to attempt to ensure 
corporate compliance. For a discussion of recent cases, see Roy Shapira, A New Caremark Era: Causes 
and Consequences, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 1855 (2021); John Armour, Jeffrey Gordon & Geeyoung Min, 
Taking Compliance Seriously, 37 YALE J. REGUL. 1, 56–58 (2020). Regarding the debate, see, for 
example, Stavros Gadinis & Amelia Miazad, The Hidden Power of Compliance, 103 MINN. L. REV. 
2135 (2019). 
123. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 101(b) (2021). 
124. See Strine, supra note 112, at 651 (“In the case of a corporation, the corporation has no power 
to give directors that authority because the corporation’s existence is premised on the nondefeasible 
promise that it will conduct only lawful business through lawful activities.”). 











directors to ensure corporate compliance with information fiduciary 
obligations, including those Balkin proposes. 
For reasons beyond Khan and Pozen’s analysis, critics may still worry 
about corporations’ likely compliance with an information fiduciary regime. 
For example, corporate directors face extra-legal forces operating in tension 
with their duties as fiduciaries. Corporate directors who are shareholders 
have enhanced incentives to maximize shareholder value, incentives that 
may lead them to act contrary to the corporation’s obligations and, in doing 
so, the duties they owe as fiduciaries.125 Of course, these countervailing 
forces may reduce the effectiveness of any obligations—information 
fiduciary or not—imposed on the corporation.126 Moreover, these forces are 
not the product of corporate law but in direct tension with it. They may be 
addressed by calibrating the liability regime to improve outcomes, for 
example, by increasing the probability of detecting violations or increasing 
sanctions.127 
Finally, there is an aspect of Khan and Pozen’s reasoning that is vague 
and elusive but nonetheless potentially useful to try to understand. As noted 
previously, Khan and Pozen assert that, under Balkin’s proposal, 
“Facebook, Google, and Twitter would, as a rule, have to temper their duties 
to users with a higher duty of loyalty to shareholders.”128 The authors do not 
explain the setting in which these companies would have to do this or what 
liability, specifically, they might incur if accused of violating their 
obligations to users under Balkin’s proposal. Do Khan and Pozen envisage 
Facebook, when accused of violating its duties to users, pointing to the 
corporate fiduciary duties of Mark Zuckerberg and his fellow directors, 
claiming that they were obliged to pursue shareholders’ interests, even if 
they diverged from users’ interests, and that the company’s fiduciary 
obligations should therefore be diluted or the company otherwise escape 
 
125. As to concerns about corporate compliance based on corporations’ self-regarding 
motivations, see text accompanying infra note 159. 
126. To pursue the analysis, one would examine whether these extra-legal forces operate more 
strongly for digital companies than other companies and whether such forces are more likely to 
overwhelm information fiduciary duties than they are to overwhelm other strategies for governing 
directors’ conduct. As to the latter issue, there is no a priori reason to think that fiduciary duties of the 
type Balkin proposes would be less effective than alternative legal rules in the face of such forces; in 
fact, the reverse might often be true because of the frequency with which courts use moralistic language 
to describe fiduciary breach. See Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPLES 
AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55, at 76 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 
1985) (arguing that “[f]iduciary law is stricter on fiduciaries than contract law is on ordinary contracting 
parties” due in part to “more intrusive normative [judicial] rhetoric” in fiduciary law); id. at 75 (“[T]hey 
[courts] often intrude into the psyches of fiduciaries. . . . [and] try to create feelings of guilt for violation 
of duty and rectitude for fulfillment of duty”). For a nuanced analysis of fiduciary law and morality, see 
MATTHEW CONAGLEN, FIDUCIARY LOYALTY: PROTECTING THE DUE PERFORMANCE OF NON-
FIDUCIARY DUTIES 106–41 (2010). 
127. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 479–488 (2004). 












liability? (Khan and Pozen cannot have in mind Facebook incurring liability 
under Balkin’s proposal because, under Khan and Pozen’s analysis, the 
corporation’s user-regarding duties yield to directors’ shareholder-
regarding duties.129) It is difficult to imagine in what other setting Balkin’s 
proposed duties would be diluted. Yet, as I have explained, such an 
approach finds no support in Delaware law, which avoids the possibility that 
directors’ obligations will conflict with—let alone be prioritized over—
obligations imposed on the corporation, such as those proposed under the 
information fiduciary model.  
E. Potential Reach of Critics’ Claims 
In the preceding sections, I argued that Khan and Pozen’s reasoning and 
claims are doctrinally and conceptually mistaken. Still, given the esteem in 
which their arguments are held, it is important to take their implications 
seriously. To this end, I look beyond digital companies to the financial 
services industry. Financial institutions are more apt analogues for large 
technology corporations than are “[d]octors, lawyers, accountants, and the 
like”130 because they hold vast reservoirs of customer information, are 
subject to fiduciary duties, and engage in activities that create tensions with 
customers’ interests.131 Most are Delaware corporations.132 I show that, 
despite the parallels between digital companies and financial services, Khan 
and Pozen’s arguments find no support in this setting. Even financial 
corporations themselves do not make these arguments, though the 
corporations would be expected to benefit if courts found them convincing. 
I conclude that Khan and Pozen’s claims, if taken seriously, would have 
pernicious effects on financial services regulation and should also be 
rejected on that basis. 
 
129. Id. at 508–10 (examining interactions between directors’ duties and those under Balkin’s 
regime). 
130. Id. at 506. 
131. See Tuch, Weakening of Fiduciary Law, supra note 77; Tuch, Financial Conglomerates, 
supra note 77. Cf. Claudia E. Haupt, Platforms as Trustees: Information Fiduciaries and the Value of 
Analogy, 134 HARV. L. REV. F. 34, 35–39 (2020) (in critiquing the information fiduciary model, 
suggesting that digital companies “in many respects are more usefully analogized to trustees than to 
professionals”). 
132. For example, all five of the largest U.S. financial holding companies are Delaware-
incorporated. See JPMORGAN CHASE & CO, ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K), at cover page (Feb. 23, 
2021); BANK OF AMERICA, ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K), at 1 (Feb. 24, 2021); CITIGROUP INC., 
ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K), at cover page (Feb. 26, 2021); WELLS FARGO & COMPANY, ANNUAL 
REPORT (FORM 10-K), at 1 (Feb. 23, 2021); THE GOLDMAN SACHS GRP., INC., ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 
10-K), at coverage page (Mar. 20, 2020) [hereinafter GOLDMAN, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT]. For further 
detailed of financial holding companies, including a ranking by total assets, see https://www.ffiec.gov/np 
w/Institution/TopHoldings [https://perma.cc/B7K4-77DV].  











Consider Delaware-incorporated Goldman Sachs, Inc., one of the largest 
U.S. financial institutions. Goldman is not a fiduciary across all of its 
operations, but it is a fiduciary across significant parts of its business.133 For 
instance, the firm manages over $1 trillion of customers’ assets and, in doing 
so, owes fiduciary duties to those customers.134 When it acts as a broker-
dealer, Goldman at times also owes fiduciary duties.135 It may be a fiduciary 
when it acts as an advisor on a corporate merger or acquisition.136 Goldman 
has even been held to owe fiduciary duties to its underwriting client in an 
initial public offering.137  
If requiring Facebook to treat users as fiduciaries would generate the 
problem of conflicting fiduciary obligations, would the same problem not 
also apply to Goldman Sachs today? Goldman’s directors—like 
Facebook’s—owe fiduciary duties under Delaware law. Both companies 
have powerful self-serving incentives.138 The interests of Goldman’s 
customers, like those of Facebook’s users, may conflict with those of the 
corporation’s shareholders. Indeed, Goldman’s interests, like those of 
financial institutions generally, often conflict with those of their 
customers.139 Many even regard the financial conglomerate business model 
that Goldman and its competitors adopt as inherently conflicted, inevitably 
putting them at odds with their clients’ interests.140 Like social media 
 
133. GOLDMAN, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 132, at 4, 17, 60 (describing regimes imposing 
fiduciary duties on the corporation); see also GOLDMAN SACHS, BUSINESS STANDARDS COMMITTEE 
IMPACT REPORT 8 (2013), https://www.goldmansachs.com/our-firm/people-and-culture/bcs-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/77P2-4DXV] [hereinafter GOLDMAN, BUSINESS STANDARDS REPORT].  
134. GOLDMAN, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 132, at 64 (showing assets under management 
for Asset Management business of $1,298 billion); id. at 60 (“[Our asset management business] 
provide[s] investment solutions including those managed on a fiduciary basis by our portfolio managers 
. . . .”); GOLDMAN, BUSINESS STANDARDS REPORT, supra note 133, at 8 (“Goldman Sachs acts in many 
different roles across our various businesses, including as advisor, fiduciary, market maker and 
underwriter.”). 
135. Broker-dealers may owe fiduciary duties to their customers. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS 54 (2011) [hereinafter SEC INVESTMENT 
ADVISER STUDY]; Howell E. Jackson & Talia B. Gillis, Fiduciary Law and Financial Regulation, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 851, 862 (Evan J. Criddle, Paul B. Miller & Robert H. 
Sitkoff eds., 2019) (describing the duties of broker-dealers as “at root fiduciary in nature”). 
136. See Andrew F. Tuch, Fiduciary Principles in Banking Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 135, at 125, 133–37 [hereinafter Tuch, Fiduciary Principles]. For an 
example, see Baker v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 656 F. Supp. 2d 226 (D. Mass. 2009). 
137. See, e.g., EBC I, Inc. v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 832 N.E.2d 26 (N.Y. 2005). Banks now 
routinely attempt to disclaim fiduciary liability in their underwriting agreements. As to the likely success 
of these provisions, see Tuch, Fiduciary Principles, supra note 136, at 139–41. 
138. See infra notes 173–174 and accompanying text. 
139. Goldman readily admits that its business model produces conflicts with clients’ interests. 
See, e.g., GOLDMAN, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 132, at 36; Goldman’s Responses on Relations 
with Clients, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/19/business/19goldmanqu 
estions.html [https://perma.cc/CE3L-WDYA] (attributing the following statements to Goldman Sachs: 
“every large financial institution, in fact virtually any business in any industry, has potential conflicts 
and we all have an obligation to manage them effectively.”). 












companies, financial institutions are huge repositories of customer 
information, much of it gained from the customers themselves.141 They have 
ample opportunities to use customers’ information for their own profit.142 
Thus Goldman and other financial services firms seem to be in much the 
same position Facebook would be if it were treated as an information 
fiduciary to users.  
Yet, the problem of conflicting fiduciary obligations as described by 
Khan and Pozen—that user-regarding corporate duties would clash with 
shareholder-regarding directors’ duties—has not been addressed or even 
identified by courts, policymakers, or commentators in the financial 
services setting.143 Nor have corporations themselves identified the issue or 
suggested that corporate duties must be diluted in the face of “higher” 
directors’ duties. This is what one would expect given the analysis in 
Sections I.B–D above. When customers have sought to impose fiduciary 
duties on a financial institution, neither parties nor courts have suggested 
any tension between directors’ duties and those the corporation may owe. 
For example, when eToys went bankrupt during the dot com bubble of 
2000–01, the company sued Goldman, claiming that the bank owed it 
fiduciary duties when the bank underwrote its initial public offering.144 The 
court made Goldman a fiduciary, seeing no conflict with—or any relevance 
whatsoever in—the duties that Goldman’s directors owe Goldman and its 
shareholders, even though identifying such a conflict, on Khan and Pozen’s 
reasoning, could well have helped Goldman’s case by diluting its 
obligations or justifying its pursuit of shareholders’ interests at the expense 
of customers’.145 
Considering that financial services firms are already in the position Khan 
and Pozen consider untenable, giving weight to their arguments would 
result in substantial and broad adverse consequences. Consider this world 
in which suddenly we see conflict where Delaware corporate law currently 
sees none. What would be the pernicious effects? The first-order effect is 
that corporations would be empowered to prioritize shareholders’ interests 
 
141. See infra notes 175–182 and accompanying text. 
142. See infra notes 175–182 and accompanying text. 
143. For example, a large-scale Securities and Exchange Commission study of the regulation of 
investment advisers makes no reference to the possibility that advisers’ fiduciary duties may conflict or 
otherwise stand in tension with directors’ duties under state corporate law. Similarly, the same study 
considers the imposition of fiduciary duties on broker-dealers without suggesting that such duties might 
conflict with state corporate law. See SEC INVESTMENT ADVISER STUDY, supra note 135. 
144. See EBC I, Inc. v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 832 N.E.2d 26 (N.Y. 2005). 
145. The decision makes no reference to directors’ duties or state corporate law. Id. Similarly, 
Goldman similarly makes no reference to directors’ duties or Delaware law in its Opening Brief or Reply 
Brief. See Opening Brief for Defendant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant, EBC I, Inc., v. Goldman, Sachs 
& Co., 832 N.E.2d at 26 (No. 601805-2002); Reply Brief for Defendant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant, 
EBC I, Inc., v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 832 N.E.2d at 26 (No. 601805-2002). 











over customer and other interests protected by fiduciary obligations on 
corporations. This, according to Khan and Pozen’s incorrect analysis, is 
already the case. What if they were right? Customer protections would be 
weakened. At a minimum, there would be uncertainty about the content and 
scope of existing corporate obligations, potentially diminishing corporate 
compliance with them and reducing customers’ or regulators’ willingness 
to enforce them. Furthermore, directors may be emboldened to promote 
shareholder welfare at the expense of other corporate constituencies—not 
just customers but also suppliers and employees. Directors might scoff at 
laws enjoining them to account for environmental interests where such 
accounting does not serve shareholders’ immediate interests. 
Under the crude, shareholders-first-and-only version of corporate law 
Khan and Pozen seem to take for granted, the consequences may indeed be 
far-reaching and harmful. But that version of corporate law does not exist 
today. Far from undermining the information fiduciary model, Delaware 
corporate law would require directors to exercise their discretion within the 
corporation’s legal limits, creating incentives for them to favor legally 
protected users’ interests over those of shareholders. The claimed tension 
between Balkin’s proposal and Delaware corporate law is illusory. 
II. CLAIMED INCOMPATIBILITY WITH DIGITAL COMPANIES’ SELF-
INTEREST 
Khan and Pozen also regard the information fiduciaries model as 
incompatible with digital companies’ powerful self-interests. In this Part, I 
explore this objection, arguing that it is significantly overstated. 
A. The Objection 
Khan and Pozen’s objection reflects two related concerns grounded in 
general fiduciary law. The first is that Facebook and other digital companies 
have such powerful self-regarding incentives that these companies may not 
properly be characterized as fiduciaries of their users.146 These incentives 
arise by virtue of firms’ business models or practices. To Khan and Pozen, 
the “business model matters. It determines the degree to which a 
commercial enterprise is motivated to advance the best interests of its 
customers, or the exact opposite.”147 For digital companies, their use of 
personally targeted advertisements motivates them to “extract as much data 
 
146. Khan and Pozen also question digital fiduciaries’ capacity for loyalty given their self-serving 
incentives. See, e.g., Khan & Pozen, supra note 6, at 513 (“[I]t is unclear how a digital fiduciary is 
supposed to fulfill its duty of loyalty to users under conditions of profound and ‘perpetual’ conflict.”); 
id. at 515 (companies’ divergence of interests may “render[] fiduciary loyalty implausible”). 












from their users as they can—a motivation that runs headfirst into users’ 
privacy [and other] interests.”148 Such powerful incentives to act contrary to 
users’ interests should be seen “as an insuperable obstacle to a fiduciary 
relationship,” Khan and Pozen suggest.149 “[F]iduciary law cannot tolerate 
an arrangement that places the fiduciary’s economic livelihood and its 
beneficiaries’ well-being fundamentally at odds,” Khan and Pozen note.150 
“[T]here are cases where the degree of misalignment [between fiduciaries’ 
incentives and their customers’ interests] renders fiduciary loyalty 
implausible. Businesses built on behaviorally targeted advertising appear to 
be one such case.”151 
Khan and Pozen’s second concern is that these companies could not 
satisfy fiduciary duties unless their business models were fundamentally 
transformed. To impose user-regarding obligations on digital companies, 
they write, “and wind up with anything recognizable as a fiduciary 
relationship, it seems to us that the legislators would have to force 
fundamental changes in the companies’ business practices . . . and preempt 
or dilute the stockholder-regarding norms under which the companies 
currently operate.”152  
B. Self-Interest and the Identification of Fiduciary Relationships 
In evaluating the first concern, I accept initially, and for the sake of 
argument, Khan and Pozen’s claim that social media companies’ business 
models create powerful incentives for corporations to act contrary to users’ 
interests, although I later interrogate this claim. But even accepting this 
claim, fiduciary law can, and often does, operate in settings in which 
fiduciaries have powerful self-interests.  
Fiduciary duties may well be imposed on self-interested actors because 
self-interested incentives themselves are not a barrier to the imposition of 
fiduciary duties. The judicial task of determining when fiduciary duties arise 
outside of categorical fiduciary relationships (trustee-beneficiary, lawyer-
client, director-company, agent-principal, etc.) is complex. Courts 
analogize to other relationships, but they often also consider the presence 
 
148. Id. at 512 (referring to “users’ privacy interests as well as any interests users might have in 
exercising behavioral autonomy or ensuring that their personal data is not stolen, sold, mined, or 
otherwise monetized down the line”). 
149. Id. at 512–13. 
150. Id. at 513. 
151. Id. at 515. 
152. Id. at 511; see also id. at 534 (“The tension between what it would take to implement a 
fiduciary duty of loyalty to users, on the one hand, and these companies’ economic incentives and duties 
to shareholders, on the other, is too deep to resolve without fundamental reform.”). 











(or not) of certain factors for identifying fiduciary relationships.153 No factor 
is decisive in either establishing or excluding a fiduciary relationship.154 As 
for self-interest in particular, it may well be the drive to serve self-interest, 
to exploit opportunities for self-advantage, that creates the need for 
fiduciary protection.155 As explained below, financial firms like Goldman 
Sachs owe fiduciary duties in a range of settings in which they face 
compelling incentives to act contrary to customers’ interests. After all, 
constraints on self-interested conduct are most valuable when parties would 
otherwise be likely to act on their self-serving incentives. 
There is another reason to reject Khan and Pozen’s concern that 
Facebook and other digital companies have such powerful self-regarding 
incentives that these companies may not properly be characterized as 
fiduciaries. When fiduciary relationships are stipulated by a statutory or 
regulatory regime, as they sometimes are, there is no need for strong 
supporting analogies or clear indicia of fiduciary relationships.156 For 
example, several states have recently proposed imposing fiduciary duties on 
broker-dealers even though courts applying analogical and other reasoning 
often do not characterize broker-dealers as fiduciaries.157 If the information 
fiduciary model were the product of legislation or regulation, which seems 
possible, there would be no need to consider whether the duties imposed 
were justified by analogical or other reasoning. 
It is also no barrier to the information fiduciary model that digital 
companies currently fall short of fiduciary standards. To the extent Khan 
and Pozen argue that digital companies cannot now act with fiduciary 
loyalty—that “fiduciary loyalty [is] implausible”158—this suggests that 
firms’ existing practices would need to change under the force of fiduciary 
duties, not that fiduciary duties could not be imposed. As fiduciaries, digital 
companies would hardly be unique in having powerful self-regarding 
 
153. As to the factors the presence of which will make a court more likely to regard a relationship 
as “fiduciary,” see Daniel B. Kelly, Fiduciary Principles in Fact-Based Fiduciary Relationships, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 135, at 3, 9–10. None of the identified indicia 
clearly concern the alignment between parties’ interests, although that factor may be relevant to the 
indicia of a repose of trust or an expectation of loyalty.  
154. Id.  
155. See, e.g., Jackson & Gillis, supra note 135, at 861–63.  
156. As Paul Miller observes, “lawmakers assert monopoly control over elaboration of the 
meaning and extension (or use) of the concept ‘fiduciary relationship.’” Paul B. Miller, The 
Identification of Fiduciary Relationships, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 
135, at 367, 369. 
157. See GOLDMAN, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 132, at 17. As to the usual judicial 
characterization of broker-dealers, see SEC INVESTMENT ADVISER STUDY, supra note 135, iii–iv; Arthur 
B. Laby, Fiduciary Principles in Investment Advice, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW, 
supra note 135, at 145-47; Andrew F. Tuch, Conduct of Business Regulation, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 537, 549 (Niamh Moloney, Eilis Ferran & Jennifer Payne eds., 
2015). 












motivations and relying on business practices that create opportunities and 
incentives for firms to act contrary to customers’ interests. If firms exploited 
these opportunities or acted on these incentives, they might well violate their 
duties, but this possibility—discussed below—is no necessary barrier to a 
fiduciary relationship. 
Finally, we might question the likely effectiveness of fiduciary duties on 
firms with powerful self-regarding motivations.159 These firms may be less 
likely to comply with user-regarding obligations than companies having 
interests aligned strongly with their users. However, Khan and Pozen’s 
expressed concern is distinct: not that fiduciary duties would be ineffective 
on firms with powerful self-regarding incentives but that those incentives 
are a barrier to fiduciary duties in the first place.160 In any case, concern 
about the effectiveness of regulation in the face of powerful countervailing 
incentives would exist whatever regulatory technique was adopted; it is not 
peculiar to fiduciary regimes. And, as discussed above,161 policymakers 
might address the potential problem by calibrating the liability regime to 
improve outcomes. 
C. Business Models and Fiduciary Duties 
Khan and Pozen’s second concern—that these companies could not 
satisfy fiduciary duties without “fundamental changes in the companies’ 
business practices”162—is similarly overstated. Khan and Pozen do not 
specify what “fundamental changes” may be required under a fiduciary 
regime, although, importantly, they never claim that these firms could not 
continue to operate or earn profits under a strong fiduciary regime.163 
This concern implicitly concedes that fiduciary duties may be imposed 
on online platforms—that a firm’s powerful self-serving incentives need not 
be an obstacle to a relationship that is recognizably fiduciary. The concern 
reveals an important potential tension between fiduciary duties and firm 
structure or business practices but nevertheless fails to undermine the 
information fiduciary model.  
 
159. Although Khan and Pozen’s objection goes to corporations’ self-regarding motivations, they 
may in fact have in mind the motivations of corporate leaders, including directors and officers, 
attributing these individuals’ motivations to their corporations. The discussion here therefore generally 
mirrors the discussion above regarding the concern that corporations may violate their obligations by 
reason of directors’ self-serving incentives. See supra notes 125–126 and accompanying text. 
160. Id. at 512–13 (suggesting that conflicts of interest between online providers and users are “an 
insuperable obstacle to a fiduciary relationship”). 
161. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
162. Id. at 511. 
163. At most, they suggest that “behaviorally targeted advertising” would be incompatible with a 
fiduciary regime, which would still leave available other forms of advertising (less lucrative perhaps but 
still profit-generating). Id. at 515 (“[T]here are cases where the degree of misalignment renders fiduciary 
loyalty implausible. Businesses built on behaviorally targeted advertising appear to be one such case.”). 











First, it is far from certain that an information fiduciary regime would 
fundamentally disrupt digital companies’ business models. Fiduciary duties, 
even strict prohibitions on conflicts of interest, are rarely categorical duties. 
They are subject to informed client consent, have limited scope, and are 
often qualified in other ways.164 For example, lawyers’ clients may give 
informed consent to most of the basic conflicts of interest that their lawyers 
face.165 Agents may contractually modify their duties or narrow the scope 
of their fiduciary relationships.166 And, even in the absence of informed 
consent, not every instance of self-interest amounts to a “conflict of interest” 
sufficient to violate a fiduciary duty of loyalty. If the fiduciary obligations 
on digital companies operated as they do in other settings, fiduciaries would 
be likely to obtain their users’ informed consent to conflicts or otherwise 
seek to limit the risk of fiduciary breach.  
Advocates of the information fiduciary model do not specify the scope 
or intensity of the fiduciary duties they would impose, but it is doubtful they 
have in mind fiduciary duties that are subject to informed consent, as 
fiduciary duties are in other settings.167 To the extent they have in mind 
especially strict fiduciary duties, duties not subject to informed consent or 
other qualifications, the model may disrupt digital firms’ business models, 
forcing firms to change their ways of doing business significantly. Courts 
have imposed fiduciary duties even if these duties might force firms to 
change their ways of doing business.168 Generally speaking, the stricter the 
fiduciary duties imposed and the broader their scope, the greater the 
pressure on organizational models that routinely creates opportunities and 
incentives for self-regarding conduct. It is not that fiduciary duties could not 
be imposed on such conflictual businesses; rather, these duties would be so 
routinely breached that, in practice, firms would need to reform their 
practices to continue operating within legal limits.  
Accordingly, if Khan and Pozen’s point is that a particularly strong 
version of fiduciary duties may require significant changes in the 
 
164. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 121–22 (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000). 
165. Id. § 122 cmt. a. (“Pursuant to this § 122, informed consent of affected clients is effective 
with respect to most conflicts of interest defined in § 121 and imputations of conflicts to affiliated 
lawyers in § 123.”).  
166. See, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, Defining Agency and Its Scope II, in COMPARATIVE 
CONTRACT LAW: A TALE OF TWO LEGAL SYSTEMS 396, 403–06 (Larry A. DiMatteo & Martin Hogg 
eds., 2016). 
167. Neil Richards and Woodrow Hartzog propose a duty of loyalty for digital companies, 
modeled on fiduciary law but distinct from Balkin’s information fiduciary model. They outline the 
content and scope of their duty, under which attempted waivers of duty would be invalid. See Richards 
& Hartzog, supra note 17, at 34–36. 
168. See, e.g., Morris v. Resol. Tr. Corp., 622 A.2d 708, 712 n.3 (Me. 1993); In re Parmalat Sec. 
Litig., 684 F. Supp. 2d 453, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). An exception may arise if the legislature has endorsed 












companies’ business practices, I agree. But the need for such changes 
should not be seen as necessarily undermining the information fiduciary 
model; it is entirely possible that these changes in firms’ practices would be 
desirable since they would be the product of strongly user-protective 
duties.169 At a minimum, these changes must be evaluated before they can 
be dismissed. The changes might even be consistent with the “more 
ambitious approaches” to regulatory reform that Khan and Pozen favor.170 
Accordingly, if an information fiduciary model were to require 
“fundamental changes” of digital companies, this might give Khan and 
Pozen reason to support, rather than oppose, particularly robust fiduciary 
duties.171 After all, they do argue for major changes of these firms’ business 
practices.172 
To illustrate these ideas, consider how fiduciary law adapted in the 
financial services industry in the face of challenges posed by firms’ business 
models. Matt Taibbi famously described Goldman Sachs as “a great 
vampire squid wrapped around the face of humanity, relentlessly jamming 
its blood funnel into anything that smells like money.”173 Anthropologist 
Karen Ho has described financial institutions like Goldman as having a 
“presentist strategy of no strategy”—they engage in “the milking of the 
present.”174 While probably exaggerated, these descriptions capture what is 
inherent in the business model of firms like Goldman: powerful economic 
incentives for self-regarding behavior.  
Like social media companies, Goldman and its competitors are huge 
reservoirs of non-public information about their clients.175 Some scholars 
even view Goldman’s information-gathering role as among its central 
 
169. Khan and Pozen suggest that such changes to firms’ business practices would need to be 
imposed from outside fiduciary law. See Khan & Pozen, supra note 6, at 511 (“[I]t seems to us that the 
legislators would have to force fundamental changes in the companies’ business practices . . . .”). 
However, change may result from the force of fiduciary duties without the need for intervention of the 
type Khan and Pozen seem to have in mind. 
170. Id. at 536. 
171. I leave aside the argument that pursuing the information fiduciary model may “cannibalize 
rather than complement” structural reforms. Id.at 537. The argument rests on the proposition that 
“lawmakers can regulate the leading online platforms as information fiduciaries or target their market 
dominance and business models, but lawmakers very likely will not do both.” Id.  
172. Although Khan & Pozen engage in “critique, not prescription,” they suggest close 
consideration be given to “structural” interventions, which “[i]mportantly, . . . do not necessarily have 
to break up firms. They can also reshape business incentives through bright-line prohibitions on specific 
modes of earning revenue . . . .” Id. at 538–39. 
173. Matt Taibbi, The Great American Bubble Machine, ROLLING STONE (Apr. 5, 2010, 7:58 PM), 
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-great-american-bubble-machine-20100405 [https://per 
ma.cc/M62A-KRJ9]. 
174. KAREN HO, LIQUIDATED: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF WALL STREET 302, 322 (2009) (ebook).  
175. See Tuch, Financial Conglomerates, supra note 77, at 564 (“[T]he structure [of financial 
conglomerates] provides firms with vast reservoirs of non-public information as well as the opportunities 
and incentives to exploit that information . . . .”). id. at 573 (such information is “largely garnered from 
[their]clients”). 











functions.176 If exploited, this information—covering everything from 
proposed mergers and acquisitions, to stock offerings, to large securities 
trades—may well produce a financial windfall for the firm while also 
harming client and other interests.177 
Conflicts with clients’ interests are hardly theoretical concerns to 
Goldman and other major financial institutions.178 Conflicts result from the 
structure of financial conglomerates.179 A former chief executive officer 
from Morgan Stanley, Goldman’s longstanding investment banking rival, 
explained, “[i]n our business, we are surrounded by conflicts—not just 
conflicts between our interests and those of our clients, but between 
different parts of our firms, and between the clients in one part of the firm 
and the clients in another.”180 More recently, Morgan Stanley’s Global Head 
of Mergers and Acquisitions quipped, “We are all totally conflicted—get 
used to it.”181 Former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Paul Volcker noted 
the strong conflicts of interest inherent in the participation of 
commercial banking organizations in proprietary or private 
investment activity. That is especially evident for banks conducting 
substantial investment management activities, in which they are 
acting explicitly or implicitly in a fiduciary capacity. When the bank 
itself is . . . trading for its own account, it will almost inevitably find 
 
176. See ALAN D. MORRISON & WILLIAM J. WILHELM, JR., INVESTMENT BANKING: 
INSTITUTIONS, POLITICS, AND LAW 5–6 (2007) (arguing that the investment bank’s “core function” is to 
act as an informational intermediary or manager of an informational marketplace, gathering otherwise-
private information and distributing it to other market actors); see also id. at 71–96 (elaborating on 
investment banks’ role at the nexus of an informational marketplace). 
177. See Tuch, Financial Conglomerates, supra note 77, at 578–81; see also Gretchen Morgenson 
& Louise Story, Clients Worried About Goldman’s Dueling Goals, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2010) https://w 
ww.nytimes.com/2010/05/19/business/19client.html [https://perma.cc/2DB9-M3KH] (raising concerns 
about Goldman’s self-interested use of confidential client information). 
178. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
179. See supra note 139. As early as the 1960s, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
recognized the “multifarious possibilities of conflict of obligation or interest in matters large and small” 
in large financial institutions. See REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95, pt. 5, at 65 (1963). Since that time, 
firms have grown massively in size and scope, magnifying the risk of conflict with clients’ interests. See 
Tuch, Weakening of Fiduciary Law, supra note 77, at 359–61.  
180. PHILIP AUGAR, THE GREED MERCHANTS: HOW THE INVESTMENT BANKS PLAYED THE FREE 
MARKET GAME (2005) (quoting Philip Purcell, Chief Exec. Officer, Morgan Stanley, Speech at 
Securities Industry Association 2003 Annual Meeting Conference: Reconnecting with America (Nov. 
7, 2003)). 
181. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Conflicted, and Often Getting a Pass, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Mar. 
12, 2012, 8:12 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/03/12/conflicted-and-often-getting-a-pass [http 
s://perma.cc/TR79-UKUB] (attributing the statement to Robert A. Kindler, Global Head and Mergers 












itself, consciously or inadvertently, acting at cross purposes to the 
interests of an unrelated commercial customer of a bank.182 
What this suggests is that social media and other technology companies 
would be hardly unique in having powerful self-regarding motivations and 
relying on business models that create incentives for firms to act contrary to 
customers’ interests. Indeed, financial firms’ self-regarding motivations 
may be considerably stronger than those of social media companies because 
of employee remuneration policies. In financial institutions, individuals are 
often remunerated on the basis of the profits they generate, supercharging 
individual incentives to promote corporate profitability in the short term.183 
Nothing suggests that these individual remuneration arrangements are 
nearly as widespread at social media companies. On the contrary, at least 
some employees at Facebook and Google seem willing to subvert corporate 
profits, which suggests that their incentives are not well aligned with those 
of corporate managers. At times, these employees appear to act according 
to their consciences, criticizing managers.184 In doing so, employees may 
blunt the incentives of firms (and their leaders) to the extent firms’ interests 
diverge from those of users. 
Yet, despite having powerful self-interest, financial services firms act as 
fiduciaries in numerous settings, which subjects them to duties that protect 
customers and constrain firms’ incentives and opportunities for self-
regarding behavior.185 As explained above, self-interested incentives 
themselves are not a barrier to fiduciary duties. The asset management 
industry exemplifies a setting in which firms have powerful economic 
incentives and opportunities to act contrary to their clients’ interests; 
nonetheless, they owe fiduciary duties to clients that impose strong 
constraints on self-interest. 
Moreover, major financial services firms’ business models have 
remained relatively intact, despite routinely producing conflicts of 
 
182. Paul Volcker’s Prepared Testimony to Senate Bank Panel, REUTERS (Feb. 2, 2010, 3:35 
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-financial-regulation-volcker-text/paul-volckers-prepared-testi 
mony-to-senate-bank-panel-idUSTRE6115WK20100202 [https://perma.cc/XR9Q-DXHJ]. Volcker 
was advocating for reforms that would have reduced financial conglomerates’ conflicts.  
183. See HO, supra note 174, at 257–71, 284. 
184. See, e.g., Makena Kelly, Facebook Employees Walk Out in Protest of Donald Trump’s Posts, 
VERGE (June 1, 2020, 1:34 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/6/1/21277135/facebook-walkout-prot 
est-virtual-president-donald-trump-posts [https://perma.cc/RB6U-NC5J] (describing criticism—
internal and external to the company—by Facebook employees of its leaders’ decisions regarding 
content moderation); see also Anat Alon-Beck, Times They Are a-Changin’: When Tech Employees 
Revolt!, 80 MD. L REV. 120, 131–35 (2020) (discussing “activism” by employees of large tech 
companies directed against corporate leaders); id. at 135 (“Since 2018, Amazon, Google, Microsoft, 
Salesforce and other tech giants have also dealt with employee activism . . . .” (omitting internal 
footnotes)). 
185. See supra notes 133–137 and accompanying text. 











interest.186 It is not entirely clear why this is so since the combination of 
robust fiduciary duties and conflictual business models would be expected 
to require firms to significantly alter their practices. The use of informed 
consent and the contractual modification of fiduciary duties seem to be part 
of the answer as does the non-enforcement of fiduciary duties.187 And yet 
fiduciary law is strong in important respects. When acting as an investment 
adviser, Goldman is generally held to a duty of “utmost good faith, and full 
and fair disclosure of all material facts,” among other duties,188 which 
effectively bar certain conflicts of interest.189 Firms themselves seem to 
regard the fiduciary regimes they owe as robust,190 and their duties are easily 
recognizable as fiduciary in nature.191 
I do not hold up financial institutions to deny that the imposition of user-
regarding duties on digital companies would disrupt their business models. 
We cannot tell whether the information fiduciary model, as implemented, 
would have this effect on certain firms without greater specification of the 
content and scope of the proposed duties and also, perhaps, without better 
understanding firms’ practices of collecting and using data. Rather, I point 
to them to illustrate that robust fiduciary duties may well be imposed on 
firms with both powerful self-interests and inherently conflictual business 
models. Whether an information fiduciary regime would disrupt digital 
companies’ models will depend on business practices and the particular 
duties imposed. And whether digital companies should owe more stringent 
fiduciary duties than those imposed on financial institutions is an open issue. 
While Balkin’s proposal to implement an information fiduciary regime may 
require further development, one cannot reasonably conclude based on the 
reasons considered in this Essay that it is “flawed—likely beyond repair”192 
or that it may “undermin[e] foundational principles of fiduciary law.”193  
 
186. There have been some significant changes, although it is questionable whether these have 
occurred under the force of fiduciary duties. For example, major financial conglomerates, particularly 
investment banks, no longer engage in significant proprietary trading and have limited private equity 
operations. See Andrew F. Tuch, The Remaking of Wall Street, 7 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 315, 333 (2017). 
187. See Tuch, Weakening of Fiduciary Law, supra note 77, at 356–67, 373–74.  
188. SEC v. Cap. Gains Rsch. Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963) (quoting PROSSER, LAW OF 
TORTS 534–35 (1955)). 
189. See Laby, supra note 157, at 155. 
190. For instance, financial services firms warn their investors about the risks they face if they 
breach their existing fiduciary duties or if new fiduciary duties are imposed. See, e.g., GOLDMAN, 2019 
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 132, at 25 (warning that the imposition of fiduciary duties or fiduciary 
breach “could increase [costs and liabilities] significantly” and “could have materially negative legal, 
regulatory and reputational consequences”). 
191. Cf. Khan & Pozen, supra note 6, at 511 (“[T]o . . . wind up with anything recognizable as a 
fiduciary relationship, it seems to us that the legislators would have to force fundamental changes in the 
companies’ business practices . . . .”). 
192. See Pozen, supra note 8. 












D. Alignment of Interests 
Finally, it is worth examining a basic assumption of Khan and Pozen’s 
argument in this Part: that the self-interests of major technology firms are 
fundamentally misaligned with those of their users. Never do Khan and 
Pozen seem to entertain the possibility of overlapping interests—the 
possibility that, to some extent, corporate conduct might serve both the 
corporation’s and users’ interests.194  
“[A]s long as such companies make most of their money through 
personally targeted advertisements, they will be economically 
motivated to extract as much data from their users as they can—a 
motivation that runs headfirst into users’ privacy interests as well as 
any interests users might have in exercising behavioral autonomy or 
ensuring that their personal data is not stolen, sold, mined, or 
otherwise monetized down the line.”195  
Khan and Pozen presumptively reject the idea that “reforms to advance the 
best interests of users by reducing addiction, limiting advertising, protecting 
privacy, and so on would also advance the best interests of an online 
platform and its shareholders.”196 But the evidentiary support offered for 
these claims is mixed. On the one hand, the conduct of “corporations like 
Facebook” “suggests that their boards do not see these reforms [to advance 
users’ interests] as likely to enhance firm value or shareholder wealth either 
in the short term or in the long term.”197 On the other hand, Khan and Pozen 
acknowledge that “[e]xperts debate whether and under what conditions 
online behavioral advertising actually enhances consumer welfare.”198  
What we do know with certainty is that online platform companies are 
not required to behave as though their own self-interests are at odds with 
those of users. As we have seen, corporate law gives considerable license 
for directors to make decisions accounting for the interests of many different 
stakeholders.199 Although inevitably some divergence occurs, shareholders’ 
interests are often aligned with those of customers and other stakeholders in 
 
194. In fact, they seem to argue the reverse. See infra note 196 and accompanying text; see also 
Khan & Pozen, supra note 6, at 505 (referring to Facebook, asserting that “addictive user behavior,” 
“divisive and inflammatory content,” and “[d]eterioration of privacy and confidentiality norms” are, by 
and large, all “good for business”). 
195. Khan & Pozen, supra note 6, at 512; see also id. at 515 (“[T]here are cases where the degree 
of misalignment [between fiduciaries’ incentives and their customers’ interests] renders fiduciary loyalty 
implausible. Businesses built on behaviorally targeted advertising appear to be one such case.”); text 
accompanying notes 147–151. 
196. Khan & Pozen, supra note 6, at 508. 
197. Id. 
198. Id. at 512 n.67. 
199. See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text. 











basic respects.200 A widely noted recent statement by the Business 
Roundtable, a trade group of chief executives from the country’s largest 
corporations, asserts “it is important to recognize that the interests of all 
stakeholders are inseparable in the long term”201—roughly the opposite 
view to Khan and Pozen’s because it suggests entirely overlapping interests. 
Like the Business Roundtable’s view asserting total overlap between users’ 
and shareholders’ interests, Khan and Pozen’s position is extreme. Rather, 
it seems trivially true that the interests of social media companies are in 
some ways aligned with those of users and in some ways misaligned. Thus 
users continue to take advantage of platforms like Facebook, even as those 
same users object to many of Facebook’s practices and encourage 
legislators to regulate Facebook. Even if the interests of large technology 
companies and their users are completely misaligned, Khan and Pozen give 
no plausible reason why this misalignment undermines the information 
fiduciary model. 
III. IMPLICATIONS AND EXTENSIONS 
The most obvious implication of the analysis in Parts I and II is that the 
information fiduciary model should not be dismissed as a viable policy 
option for regulating digital data collectors based on Khan and Pozen’s 
objections. Balkin’s proposal is not incompatible with corporate law or 
fiduciary law more generally. If Balkin’s proposal or similar reforms were 
adopted, there would be no sensible risk of “the unraveling of fiduciary 
law,”202 of “violence either to the companies themselves or to fundamental 
principles of fiduciary law,”203 or of the resulting regime “teeter[ing] on the 
edge of contradiction.”204  
The second implication of this Essay’s analysis is that no reform of 
corporate law would be required to implement Balkin’s proposal. In vague 
terms, Khan and Pozen suggest otherwise. They assert a need for reform to 
“preempt or dilute the stockholder-regarding norms under which the 
 
200. See Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 82, at 109 (“For example, how the company treats 
employees could well affect its ability to attract, retain, and motivate the members of its labor force; 
how the company deals with customers could affect its ability to attract and retain them; and how the 
company deals with local communities or the environment could well affect its reputation and standing 
in ways that could be important for its success.”). 
201. Redefined Purpose of a Corporation: Welcoming the Debate, BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 25, 
2019), https://medium.com/@BizRoundtable/redefined-purpose-of-a-corporationwelcoming-the-debat 
e-8f03176f7ad8 [https://perma.cc/A5ZJ-PUST]. 
202. Khan & Pozen, supra note 6, at 534–35. 
203. Id. at 507. 
204. Id. at 504 (“Right off the bat, these observations [about what directors’ duties require] give 
reason to question the feasibility, if not also the coherence, of applying the information-fiduciary idea 













companies currently operate.”205 They also refer to government intervention 
that would “clearly prioritize” fiduciary duties to users under Balkin’s 
proposal over shareholder-regarding directors’ duties.206 The critique refers 
to “modif[ying]” corporate law “through state or federal legislation to 
authorize or compel platforms to put users’ interests ahead of stockholders’ 
interests (either in general or in specific respects).”207 So convincing has 
Khan and Pozen’s critique proven that some continued supporters of 
Balkin’s proposal now regard legal reform of corporate law as necessary.208 
But this is misguided. Whatever reform to corporate law critics have in 
mind, it would be unnecessary for the reasons detailed above. 
In fact, such reform may be harmful. Since existing corporate law 
already allows directors to take into account users’ interests instrumentally 
(in service of shareholders’ interests), as Khan and Pozen acknowledge,209 
the reforms they refer to would need to go further and allow directors to 
make decisions in service of users’ interests as well—a reform of the 
corporation’s objectives. Such reform may succeed in diluting 
“stockholder-regarding norms under which the companies currently 
operate.”210 But scholars worry that altering the corporation’s purpose in 
this way would weaken monitoring of corporate leaders and thereby 
“increase managerial slack, worsen corporate performance, and reduce 
economic efficiency and value-creation.”211  
Third, Khan and Pozen’s argument is less with Balkin than with the 
traditional model of corporate regulation. Better understood, their criticisms 
are directed at the model of regulating corporations by imposing obligations 
and constraints on corporations themselves. Under this model, corporate 
law governs relations between directors and shareholders, but the protection 
of non-shareholder interests must occur outside corporate law. 
“Environmental regulations control environmental externalities. . . . Labor 
law governs the relationship between employees and firms. Competition 
law protects and preserves competitive markets.”212 According to this 
approach, corporate leaders face “a constrained optimization problem: 
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maximize the value of the company subject to side constraints imposed by 
regulation.”213 Many doubt the merits of this traditional approach, 
questioning whether regulations outside corporate law will adequately 
protect stakeholder interests other than shareholders.214 Others prefer this 
approach, asking whether relaxing corporate leaders’ fiduciary duties to 
allow them to protect non-shareholder interests (a change that would give 
leaders greater decision-making discretion) will actually better address 
societal concerns.215 But neither side contends, as Khan and Pozen do in the 
social media setting, that corporate law is in tension with outside constraints 
on corporations or that those constraints may yield to directors’ shareholder-
regarding duties. Corporate law does not operate in this way, nor should it.  
Still, there is much more to be determined about the content and scope 
of duties in the information fiduciary model. Khan and Pozen examine a 
potential tension between fiduciary law and business models. Whether the 
model will disrupt digital companies’ businesses, requiring significant 
changes to the ways they make money, is not clear. But even if the model 
will have this effect, it does not follow that we need to reject the model 
without an assessment of those changes.  
CONCLUSION 
This Essay responds to widely noted, influential, and trenchant criticism 
of a model that would make Facebook, Google, Twitter, and other digital 
companies information fiduciaries, a model that has been inscribed in 
proposed federal and state legislation. These criticisms regard the 
information fiduciary model as “undercutting directors’ duties to 
shareholders, undermining foundational principles of fiduciary law, or 
both.”216 I have attempted to expose and highlight the flaws in these 
criticisms. They fail to undermine the model or similar reforms that would 
impose user-regarding obligations on corporations. Claims of 
incompatibility with corporate law rely on a partial understanding of 
corporate law, which, if accepted, would have pernicious and far-reaching 
consequences in other spheres of corporate regulation. Concern that social 
media companies’ powerful self-interests—whether the product of their 
business models or corporate law—are incompatible with fiduciary duties 
is overstated; this is true even though the information fiduciary model needs 
greater specificity of the scope and intensity of the duties it would impose. 
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The information fiduciary model deserves careful and rigorous assessment, 
given the risks major digital companies pose for user privacy and data 
security. Although critics demonstrate laudable concern for these risks, their 
core criticisms provide no basis for denying the information fiduciary model 
that assessment. 
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